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This dissertation consists of three essays that examine macroeconomic implica-
tions of trade liberalization. There has been a long-lasting debate on how trade
openness influences the effectiveness of monetary policy. The first two essays provide
a novel empirical and theoretical investigation into this issue. Motivated by recent
new phenomena in U.S. labor market, the third essay is a work in progress that seeks
to explore the evolution of U.S. manufacturing employment structural dynamics, and
its connection with import competition.
The first essay uses annual data of US manufacturing industries at 4-digit SIC
level from 1972 to 2005 to conduct the empirical analysis. It shows that trade open-
ness is negatively associated with industry-level effect of monetary policy, and at a
given degree of trade openness, industries that involve in offshoring don’t necessarily
exhibit weaker responses. These empirical findings are hard to reconcile with the
implications of standard open economy New Keynesian model, which indicates that
trade openness strengthens the effectiveness of monetary policy and doesn’t model
offshoring separately.
The second essay provides a new open economy New Keynesian model that can
explain the empirical findings in the first essay. The model features endogenously
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determined international trade pattern based on Ricardian trade theory, and one-way
offshoring from the advance economy to the less developed one. This model highlights
a new channel through which trade openness influences the monetary transmission
mechanism: a decline in both trade and offshoring costs raises labor demand elasticity.
Trade openness weakens the effects of monetary policy changes on output and inflation
by dampening the responses of the domestic labor market. The calibrated model
indicates that, when the economy moves from trade and financial autarky to a modern
trade regime with an incomplete international financial market, the monetary policy
shocks have 22% less of an effect on real GDP and consumer price inflation.
The third essay provides the motivation on why to explore the evolution of U.S.
manufacturing employment structural dynamics, introduces the methodology, and
describes the dataset as well as future works.
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CHAPTER 1
Trade Liberalization and Effectiveness of Monetary Policy:
Industry-Level Evidence
1. Introduction
The monetary transmission mechanism is one of the most studied topics in mon-
etary economics. It describes how the monetary policy induced changes in money
stock or federal funds rate influence real economic activities and inflation. Recent
empirical literature indicates that the monetary policy transmission mechanism in
the US has changed. The monetary policy disturbances have had a weaker effect on
output and inflation after 1980 when compared to the effects before 1980 (see Boivin,
Kiley, and Mishkin (2010) and the references therein). The literature has investi-
gated the sources of this evolution of monetary transmission mechanism. Boivin and
Giannoni (2006) and Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2000) attribute this to the shift in
the systematic component of monetary policy.1, while having witnessed the striking
growth in trade during 1972 to 2005, many have asked whether globalization can be
an important factor that stabilizes the responses of output and inflation to monetary
1 Boivin and Giannoni (2006) and Clarida et al. (2000) shows that US economy has entered a
new monetary policy regime in post 1980s, where the interest rule is more sensitive to inflation
fluctuations. Since the new rule induces a greater procyclical movement of real interest rate, it’s more
stabilizing. The literature also relates the changed monetary transmission mechanism to the decline
in the volatility of unemployment rate and inflation in US economy since 1980, which are together
referred to as Great Moderation. The evolution of monetary transmission mechanism has induced
recent literature another major explanation is the time varying structural disturbance variances, e.g.
Sims and Zha (2006) and Primiceri (2005)
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disturbances.2 Since the latter argument still lacks explicit empirical evidence, this
paper contributes to the literature in this direction.
This paper investigates the relationship of trade openness and the industry-level
effect of monetary policy. A large literature has studies the connection of trade open-
ness and the advanced economy’s labor market outcomes, and recently an increasing
number of empirical studies have found that trade liberalization - especially the im-
port competition from low wage countries - has significant effect on the employment
and labor wages in the advanced economies.3 Given the important role of labor mar-
ket outcomes in determining output and inflation dynamics,4 a trade liberalization
induced structural change in the labor market can potentially alter the monetary
transmission mechanism.
A significant feature of recent wave of trade liberalization is the increased global
production network. Due to revolutionary advances of transportation and commu-
nication technology, intermediate products can be moved quickly and cheaply across
2Share of import in GDP has increased from 5% to 15.5% in US during this period. Rogoff (2003)
is one of the first to argue the disinflationary effect of globalization: Since the globalization raises
market competition and leads to greater goods and labor mobility, it reduces the inflation-output
tradeoff. Central bank engage less in creating inflation surprise, leading to a lower equilibrium
inflation. In contrast, Ball (2006) argues that globalization has little impact on inflation dynamics,
and questions Rogoff (2003)s argument by showing the inflation-output tradeoff has increased with
the globalization process. There’s still no consensus on the connection of trade openness and the
effectives of monetary policy.
3Empirical literature shows that increase in offshoring activities raises the demand elasticity of
unskilled labor in US, e.g. Senses (2010), aggravates income inequality in U.S Feenstra and Hanson
(1999), reduces manufacturing employment in U.S. Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price
(2016), and increases job displacement in Germany, e.g. Geishecker (2008).
4Labor market outcome is important for output since payment to labor accounts for over 50% of
value added output. Labor market outcomes is important for inflation dynamics since modern macro
theory indicates that prices are set at constant markup over real marginal cost and the payment to
labor is the largest component of real marginal cost.
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borders, and the output of many production processes can be monitored electroni-
cally, facilitating firms in advanced economies to offshoring labor intensive produc-
tion, or routine service jobs to low-wage countries. Hence, in addition to the standard
trade openness measure, this paper uses offshoring as an alternative measure of trade
openness, and examines how industries’ offshoring status influences the industry-level
effect of monetary policy.
The empirical analysis uses annual data of US manufacturing industries at 4-
digit SIC level from 1972 to 2005. It begins with an estimation of sectoral vector
auto-regressions (VARs) that contain common and industry specific variables. The
model is specified so that the identified monetary policy shocks are identical across
industries, while the shock response functions can vary freely across industries. The
monetary policy shock is identified using the standard recursive identification scheme
following Sims (1980). The next step is to examine the relationship between the im-
pulse response functions of manufacturing industries’ output and the trade openness
measures using heteroscedasticity-robust regression.
The cross section analysis reveals that the trade openness measures are negatively
associated with the effect of monetary policy on industry-level output, and at given
degree of trade openness, industries that involve in offshoring don’t necessarily exhibit
weaker responses to monetary policy changes. To the best of my knowledge, this result
is new in the literature, and imposes a challenge to the quantitative implications
of existing open economy New Keynesian models, i.e. Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler
(2002) and Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005). With standard calibration choices or estimated
parameter values, these models indicate little or positive connection of trade openness
3
CHAPTER 1. TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MONETARY
POLICY: INDUSTRY-LEVEL EVIDENCE
and effects of monetary policy changes, and they don’t distinguish offshoring from
rest of the international trade activities.
This paper is related to at least three strands of literature. Firstly, the empirical
analysis is closely connected to Dedola and Lippi (2005) and Peersman and Smets
(2005), which explore how industry characteristics influence diverse industry-level
responses to monetary policy. The first paper focuses on twenty industries in five
OCED countries, and finds industry-level effect of monetary policy is systematically
affected by industry’s output durability, borrowing capacity measures, and financing
requirement measures. The second paper studies the effect of monetary policy of
eleven industries of seven euro-area countries, and shows an important role of in-
dustries’ financial structure, in particularly average firm size and financial leverage
ratio, in determining business cycle asymmetry in industry-level effect of monetary
policy. Different from the existing literature, this paper investigates the relationship
of industry-level trade openness measures and the industry-level effect of monetary
policy in U.S.
Secondly, this paper is connected with the earlier empirical literature that ex-
plores how trade openness influences inflation. Romer (1993) provides cross-country
evidence on the negative relationship between trade openness and inflation level, and
argues that trade openness reduces sacrifice ratio based on time-inconsistency model
of Barro and Gordon (1983). Daniels, Nourzad, and Vanhoose (2005) and Badinger
(2009) find that, once central independence is controlled for, trade openness raises
sacrifice ratio, and uses New Keynesian framework to reconcile this finding and the
negative relationship between trade openness and inflation level. These empirical
4
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findings focus solely on the relationship between inflation level and trade (or finan-
cial) openness, instead of the connection of trade openness and the responsiveness of
inflation as well as output. Guerrieri et al. (2010) estimate a New Keynesian Philips
Curve (NKPC henceforth) based on a New Keynesian model that features variable
demand elasticity, they find that foreign competition is quantitatively important in
explaining U.S. traded goods’ inflation dynamics. Empirical works by Monacelli and
Sala (2009) and Bianchi and Civelli (2015) show that international factors can affect
inflation dynamics in many countries.
Thirdly, the empirical findings in this paper is related to the implications of ex-
isting open economy New Keynesian model. Woodford (2007), based on Clarida
et al. (2002), examines several channels through which trade and financial openness
can potentially affect monetary transmission mechanism, and finds little evidence for
openness to be the causes of weaker effect of monetary policy shocks. Milani (2012)
estimates a small open economy version of Clarida et al. (2002) and finds little ef-
fects of degree of openness on transmission of monetary policy shock. Cwik, Mller,
and Wolters (2011) estimate a model which features none constant demand elasticity
following Gust et al. (2010). The producers’ mark-up vary with real exchange rate
and there is strategic complementarity of exporters’ price setting. They find greater
openness leads to more effective monetary policy.
2. Econometric Model
This section provides empirical evidence on the role of trade openness in determin-
ing the effects of monetary policy changes on manufacturing industry-level output.
I measure the industry-level output using total value added from the NBER-CES
5
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Manufacturing Industry Database, which provides annual data for 459 industries at
the 4-digit SIC level from 1958 to 2009. The sample period in this paper is from 1972
to 2005. The following analysis uses two openness measures, import penetration ratio
following Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) and the measure of offshoring following
Senses (2010) and Schott (2004). Both measures are constructed using data from
NBER International Finance and Trade Data. The details of constructing offshoring
measure are given in the Appendix A.7.
The summary statistics of the openness measures are given in Table 1.1. The
average import penetration ratio is 0.163 and the average offshoring measure is 0.044.
These two measures are dispersed across industries. The standard deviation of the
import penetration ratio is 0.175, and the the standard deviation of the offshoring
measure is 0.101. Figure 1.1 plots the cross industry average of the two openness
measures from 1972 to 2005. The import penetration ratio has increased from 0.059
to 0.29 and the offshoring measure has almost tripled.
2.1. Panel VAR Model. The effects of monetary policy shocks on manufac-
turing industry-level output are estimated using structural autoregression models.
Let
Xt = [Yt, pit, Rt, Yi,t]
′ (2.1)
be a vector that contains time t value of real GDP, Yt, PCE inflation, pit,
5 Federal
Funds Rate, Rt, total value added of industry i deflated using GDP deflator, Yi,t.
5As a part of the robustness check, I tried to use GDP deflator inflation or the combination of
GDP deflator inflation and commodity price instead of the benchmark specification. The results are
qualitatively not affected. An advantage of using PCE inflation is that it does not generate price
puzzle.
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Variables are annual from 1972 to 2005. Real GDP and industry-level output are in
log levels, PCE inflation is the difference of two consecutive log levels of the PEC
index and the Federal Funds Rate is in percentage levels. Assume that Xt has a
moving average representation, which is given by
Xt = α + A(l)t, A(0) = A0 (2.2)
where α is a 4 × 1 vector of constant terms, and A(l) is a 4 × 4 matrix, which is
an infinite order matrix lag polynomial. t = [Y , pi, R, Yi ] is a vector of structural
disturbances. The elements of t are three common shocks, aggregate output shock,
Y , inflation shock, pi and the monetary policy shock, R, and an industry-level shock,
Yi . These shocks are mutually uncorrelated, and follow normal distribution with zero
mean and
E[t
′
t] ≡ Σ (2.3)
where Σ is a 4× 4 matrix in which the variance of structural disturbances are along
its diagonal and the zeros are elsewhere.
The estimated reduced form vector autoregression model that is associated with
equation 2.2 and 2.3 is given by
Xt = β +B(l)µt, B(0) = I and E[µµ
′] = Ω (2.4)
where β is a 4 × 1 vector of constant terms, and B(l) is a 4 × 4 matrix, which
is an infinite order matrix lag polynomial, and can be recovered from the estimated
7
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coefficients of the VAR representation of Xt. µt is a vector of reduced form innovation
terms.
The reduced form VAR is estimated with restrictions on B,6 which are given by
bi,j(l) = 0, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j = 4 for all l (2.5)
where bi,j(l) is the element at row i and column j at lag l of B. These restrictions
rule out the possibility for industry-level output to affect variables in the common
subsystem. This specification assumes that the identified monetary policy shocks
are common across manufacturing industries. At the same time, the last row of B
can vary freely across industries. In the next step, these heterogeneous responses of
industry-level output can be related to industry-level openness measures.
A comparison of equations 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 indicates that µt = A0t, α = β,
and A(l) = B(l)A0, so that the matrix A0 provides the link between structural and
reduced form VAR models. The standard recursive identification scheme is adopted
to get matrix A0, following Sims (1980). Cholesky decomposition of the covariance
matrix of the innovations from reduced from model, Ω, provides the lower triangular
matrix A0, which satisfies A0ΣA
′
0 = Ω. With variables in order shown in equation
2.1, when the third element is interpreted as monetary policy shock, the identification
scheme assumes that monetary policy responds to aggregate output and inflation
contemporaneously, and industry-level output has no effect on monetary policy.
6Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) also placed restrictions on the reduced form VAR to get common
shocks, but their focus is effect of oil shock’s on manufacturing jobs. I estimated the VAR model
without restrictions as the robustness check, and results are not qualitatively affected.
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Since the recursive identification scheme gives the exactly identified structural
model, equation 2.2, I can use it to compute the impulse responses of the industry-
level output to identified expansionary monetary policy shock. Two measures are
chosen for the industry-level impulse responses, 1) the maximum elasticity, Yˆi,M , and
2) the average first three-year elasticity, Yˆi,A.
7 The summary statistics of these two
elasticities are given in Table 1.1. The mean of the maximum elasticity, Yˆi,M , is
2.045, and the mean of the three year average elasticity, Yˆi,A, is 0.745. The three-
year average elasticities vary within a wide range, from -14.959 to 10.519, and their
standard deviation is at 2.362. The maximum elasticities are also dispersed across
industries, ranging from -2.571 to 11.917, and their standard deviation is at 2.311.
2.2. Cross-Section Regression. In the regression analysis that follows, I esti-
mate:
Yˆi,j = c+ γ1Openness Measuresi + ηi j ∈ {A,M} (2.6)
where Yˆi,e is the industry i’s output elasticity and c is a constant term. Openness
Measures in this paper are the industry-level import penetration ratio, and the off-
shoring measure is used as robustness check. These two measures are entered one at
a time in the regression model, equation 2.6. To examine whether the relationship
between industry-level output elasticity and trade openness is affected by industry’s
7The average of first three year elasticity is the average 2nd to 4th impulse responses. Including the
1st impulse response into this average elasticity measure doesn’t affect the result.
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involving in offshoring activities or not, I also estimate:
Yˆi,j = c+ γ2Import Penetrationi + γ3Offshoring Dummyi
γ4Import Penetrationi ×Offshoring Dummyi + ξi j ∈ {A,M} (2.7)
where the offshoring dummy of industry i takes the value 1 if industry i imports
non-energy intermediate inputs. I use offshoring dummy instead of value-added off-
shoring in order to avoid the multi-collinearity problem. I estimate both regression
models with 2 digit SIC level industry dummies, in order to control industry-specific
factors that may affect how industry-level output react to monetary policy shocks,
e.g. industry specific financial characteristics. The regression uses heteroscedasticity
robust standard error.
3. Empirical Results
Table 1.2 presents the regression results. According to the estimated results from
equation 2.6, the trade openness -measured by import penetration ratio or offshoring-
is negatively associated with the industry-level output elasticities. These results are
highly significant, and they are not affected by whether or not the industry dum-
mies are included. The coefficient of the import penetration ratio for the maximum
elasticity regression with industry dummies indicates that when import penetration
increase by 10%, the peak of impulse responses of industry-level output will be low-
ered by 0.18. This corresponds to a 9% decrease in industry-level output maximum
elasticities from their mean level. Using offshoring measure, the estimated effect is
larger. A 10% increase in offshoring is associated with a 15.78% decrease in industry-
level output maximum elasticities from their mean level. The estimated results from
10
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the three-year average elasticities with industry dummies are striking. Using import
penetration and offshoring as openness measures indicates respectively 41.2% and
24.2% decrease in three year average elasticities from their mean levels.
The estimation results of equation 2.7 reveal a negative and significant relation-
ship between import penetration and industry-level output elasticities. Yet, whether
output elasticities of industries that import non-energy intermediate inputs are more
severely affected by trade openness is ambiguous: The coefficients in front of the
import penetration and offshoring dummy interaction terms in maximum elasticity
regressions as well as those coefficients in the three-year average elasticity regression
without industry dummies are negative but not highly significant, and the coefficients
of the interaction term in the three-year average elasticity regression with industry
dummies is positive and not significance. The coefficients in front of offshoring dummy
are all positive and not significant, implying that given import penetration ratio at
its mean level, switching from non-offshoring to offshoring magnifies the effect of
monetary policy on industry-level output.
A possible explanation for the negative relationship of trade openness and industry-
level effect of monetary policy involves two channels: the demand spillover channel
and the labor demand elasticity channel. Greater trade openness strengthens the link-
age of domestic consumption and foreign production, which leads to a greater demand
spillover effect. The greater trade openness, which is associated with a lower trade
friction, provides producers a greater ease to substitute between domestic and foreign
produced goods, driving up labor demand elasticity. Under greater trade openness
regime, a given monetary expansion has a weaker stimulative effect on domestic la-
bor demand, and due to the increased labor demand elasticity, a given increase in
11
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labor demand raises labor wage by less. Hence, under greater trade openness, a given
monetary expansion has a weaker effect on domestic output and inflation. The in-
tuition for the ambiguous effect of offshoring on the relationship of trade openness
and industry-level effect of monetary policy can be related to the offshoring induced
productivity effect, which strengthens the comparative advantage of domestic pro-
duces and offsets the effect of trade openness on labor demand elasticity and demand
spillover.
4. Robustness with Evidence on Price
This section examines whether the findings on the relationship of trade openness
and the effect of monetary policy on industry-level output hold, when the vector
of variables in equation 2.1 is augmented with industry-level prices. The measure
of industry-level prices is the deflator of total value of shipment. This alternative
specification also provides evidence on the relationship of trade openness and the
effect of monetary policy on industry-level prices.
The estimation procedure is the same as that is used to estimate the baseline
specification. The first step is to estimate the restricted VAR model for all the
industries, in the sense that the industry-level output and price measures have no
effect on aggregate variables, while aggregate variables have contemporaneous effect
on industry-level output and price measures. The second step is to regress the elas-
ticities of industry-level output and price with respect to monetary policy shocks on
the industry-level trade openness measures. The summary statistics of variables that
are used in second stage regression are given in Table 1.3, and the results are given
in Table 1.4 and 1.5.
12
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Table 1.4 indicates that the qualitative results of the baseline specification still
holds for the alternative specification: trade openness weakens the effect of monetary
policy on industry-level output, and at given degree of trade openness, offshoring
has an ambiguous effect on industry-level effect of monetary policy. As for the rela-
tionship of trade openness and the effect of monetary policy on industry-level prices,
Table 1.5 provides a less clear result. Although the coefficients in front of offshoring
are all negative and some are highly significant, some coefficients in front of the im-
port penetration measures are positive. A possible reason for this ambiguous effect is
that, when trade openness promotes product market competition, which lowers the
markup of the monopolistic pricing, it strengthens the responsiveness of industry-
level prices to monetary policy induced demand changes. This effect offsets the effect
associated with increased demand spillover and strengthened factor market competi-
tion, which stabilizes the marginal costs’ responsiveness to monetary policy induced
demand changes.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides a novel empirical evidence on how trade openness and in-
dustries’ offshoring status influence the industry-level effect of monetary policy. This
empirical evidence challenges the standard open economy New Keynesian model’s
implication for how trade openness is associated with the effectiveness of monetary
policy, which suggests that more research can be done in this direction.
One caveat of this paper is that the industry-level output and price measures are
annual-level, which leads the estimated elasticities of these two measures with respect
to monetary policy shocks imprecise. The current result holds under the assumption
13
CHAPTER 1. TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MONETARY
POLICY: INDUSTRY-LEVEL EVIDENCE
that measurement errors are independently associated with trade openness measures.
Data with higher frequency are desirable to validate the findings in this paper.
14
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Table 1.1. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Import Penetration Ratio 0.163 0.175 0 0.864
Offshoring 0.044 0.101 0 0.889
Offshoring Dummy 0.432 0.496 0 1
Maximum Elasticity 2.045 2.311 -2.571 11.917
Three Year Average Elasticity 0.745 2.362 -14.959 10.519
Number of Observations 417
Note: Summary statistics of variables in baseline regressions.
Figure 1.1. Openness Measures.
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Table 1.3. Summary Statistics: Robustness
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Import Penetration Ratio 0.163 0.175 0 0.864
Offshoring 0.044 0.101 0 0.889
Offshoring Dummy 0.432 0.496 0 1
Maximum Elasticity of Output 2.045 2.311 -2.571 11.917
Three Year Average Elasticity of Output 0.745 2.362 -14.959 10.519
Maximum Elasticity of Price 0.502 0.876 -1.801 6.135
Three Year Average Elasticity of Price -0.944 0.917 -5.038 4.68
Number of Observations 383
Note: Summary statistics of variables in robustness check regressions.
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CHAPTER 2
Globalization, Offshoring and Monetary Control
1. Introduction
Recent empirical evidence reveals that monetary transmission mechanism has
changed: output and inflation in the U.S. economy exhibit weaker responses to iden-
tified monetary policy changes in post 1980 than they did in pre 1980. The first
chapter in this dissertation finds that trade openness can weaken the effectiveness
of monetary policy. In addition, motivated by the recent boom of offshoring activi-
ties, it explores how industry’s offshoring status influence its output responsiveness to
monetary policy changes, and shows that at a given degree of trade openness, indus-
tries that involve in offshoring don’t necessarily exhibit weaker responses to monetary
policy changes.
These findings are hard to reconcile with the quantitative implications of existing
open economy New Keynesian models, i.e. Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (2002) and Gal´ı
and Monacelli (2005). With standard calibration choices or estimated parameter val-
ues, these models indicate little negative connection of trade openness and effects of
monetary policy changes.1 In addition, existing open economy New Keynesian models
1Woodford (2007), based on Clarida et al. (2002), examines several channels through which trade and
financial openness can potentially affect monetary transmission mechanism, and finds little evidence
for openness to be the causes of weaker effect of monetary policy shocks. Milani (2012) estimates
a small open economy version of Clarida et al. (2002) and finds little effects of degree of openness
on transmission of monetary policy shock. Cwik, Mller, and Wolters (2011) estimate a model which
features none constant demand elasticity following Gust et al. (2010). The producers’ mark-up vary
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characterize trade openness using the home bias parameter in consumer preference
or the parameter that determines the share of imported inputs in production. De-
spite its indisputable merits, this specification confounds the changes in preference
or technology with the real causes of trade openness, and thereby limits the model’s
ability to evaluate the effects of offshoring activities and growth in general imports
separately.
The contribution of this paper is to provide a New Keynesian open economy
stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that features one-way offshoring from
an advanced economy to a less developed economy. This model is based on the static
model in Rodrguez-Clare (2010). The model features tradable-goods’ producers with
heterogeneous technology in both countries, and the trade pattern is determined
by the Ricardian trade theory, following Eaton and Kortum (2002). The tradable-
goods’ producers in the advanced economy have a higher average technology level
than their counterparts do in the less developed economy. This generates a wage
gap between the two countries, thereby providing the advanced economy’s tradable-
goods’ producers an incentive to offshore a fraction of the production process to the
less developed economy. In the baseline model, the international financial market is
incomplete, in the sense that two countries trade risk-free nominal bonds. Since the
international financial market structure crucially determines the relationship of real
exchange rate and macro fundamentals,2 an alternative structure - Financial Autarky -
with real exchange rate and there is strategic complementarity of exporters’ price setting, They find
greater openness leads to more effective monetary policy.
2Under financial autarky, the real exchange rate is pinned down by the trade balance condition,
and under incomplete international financial market, it’s governed by the Uncovered Interest Rate
Parity condition.
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is also considered. The calibrated baseline model shows that when the economy moves
from trade autarky to a trade regime, in which import to GDP ratio and offshoring to
import ratio are at 2005 levels, the effects of monetary policy shock on real GDP and
inflation are lowered by 15%. When the trade liberalization process is accompanied
by the international financial market moving from autarky to the incomplete market
case, the effects of monetary policy shock on real GDP and inflation are lowered by
22%.
The quantitative model highlights three channels through which trade openness
affects the monetary transmission mechanism. Greater trade openness increases the
exposure of consumer price to foreign production cost, which is the composition ef-
fect.3 Greater trade openness strengthens the linkage of domestic consumption and
foreign production, which is the demand spillover effect. These two channels have
been extensively studied in the existing literature. Increasing general imports and
offshoring activities magnifies the effects of both channels. The third channel relies
on the fact that greater trade openness raises labor demand elasticity (see Senses
(2010)), which has not been explored in the literature that focuses on the connec-
tion of trade openness and monetary transmission mechanism. Decline in trade cost
boosts general imports and promotes product market competition, raising labor de-
mand elasticity. Decline in offshoring cost increases the chance to substitute domestic
labor with imported goods and services, while reducing the production cost of domes-
tic tradable-goods’ producers. This strengthens their comparative advantage, which
3It is a common feature of open economy New Keynesian Phillips Curve that greater trade openness
strengthens the connection of CPI inflation and foreign factors (foreign slackness or imported goods’
prices), e.g. Benigno and Faia (2010), Razin and Loungani (2005), Sbordone (2008) and Guerrieri
et al. (2010).
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in turn increases the demand of domestic labor and reduces labor demand elasticity.
The latter is reminiscent of the productivity effect in the offshoring literature.4 The
net effect of the offshoring activities on labor demand elasticity depends on the degree
of trade openness and the calibration choice of trade elasticity.
The intuition for the interactions of the three channels to generate the observed
result is as follows. The greater demand spillover stabilizes the effect of a given
monetary expansion on hours worked. With a larger labor demand elasticity, a given
increase in labor demand boosts domestic real wage by less. The combined effect of
these two channels is that a given monetary expansion has a weaker effect on domestic
real wage and hours worked, while it has a magnified effect on foreign real wage and
hours worked. When the trade friction is realistically high, domestic production cost
plays a dominating role in determining domestic consumer price inflation dynamics.
Greater trade openness reduces the effect of monetary policy shock on inflation and
output.
How can the structure of the international financial market influence the monetary
transmission mechanism? The calibrated model indicates that a given monetary
expansion depreciates the real exchange by less under the incomplete international
financial market than it does under financial autarky. Real exchange rate depreciation
induces an expenditure switching effect, putting an upward pressure on domestic real
4Recent papers that study the implications of offshoring activities are Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud
(2014), Rodrguez-Clare (2010) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). These papers focus on
the medium to long run effects on the labor market. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) highlights
the positive productivity effect associated with increased exposure to cheap imports. It reduces the
production cost and promote middle skilled workers to upgrade their skills level. As a consequence,
expansion in offshoring activities benefits workers in all skill levels. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud
(2014) and Rodrguez-Clare (2010) argue the possible negative effect of offshoring activities on do-
mestic wage since the terms of trade deterioration may dominate the positive productivity effect in
medium run.
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wage and hours worked. Liberalizing the international financial market dampens the
expenditure switching effect. As a consequence, it reduces the stimulative effect of
a given monetary expansion on real wage and hours worked, and leads to subdued
responses of consumer price inflation and real GDP. Under financial autarky, the
trade balance condition must hold. The final good producers operate as if using only
locally produced inputs regardless of trade openness regime. International demand
spillover is negligible. Since the expenditure switching effect dominates the other
aforementioned channels, trade openness moderately strengthens the effectiveness of
monetary policy.
In terms of business cycle properties, this model can generate two business cy-
cle patterns identified in SVAR studies, which most international business cycle and
New Keynesian open economy models fail to capture. Firstly, domestic technology
progress leads an appreciation in real exchange rate, which is consistent with the find-
ings of Enders, Mller, and Scholl (2011) and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2014) for
the US.5 The core of the model that generates this pattern is the presence of an en-
dogenously determined non-traded sector. When positive technology shock raises the
production cost of domestic non-traded goods relative to that of foreign non-traded
goods, the domestic consumption goods become more expensive than the foreign ones,
leading to the appreciation of real exchange rate. The second pattern is that domes-
tic technology progress has contractionary effects on domestic hours worked, which is
widely documented in the literature, e.g. Gal´ı (1999) and Kimball, Fernald, and Basu
(2006). This result is also driven by the same mechanism. Since positive technology
5Corsetti et al. (2008) shows that, for international macro model with incomplete international
financial market, positive productivity shock can lead real exchange rate to appreciate, when trade
elasticity is low or the productivity shocks are persistent enough.
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shock leads real exchange rate to appreciate, the induced expenditure switching effect
dominates the strengthened absolute advantage effect, leading to a decrease in the
demand of domestic labor.
This paper is related to the existing open economy New Keynesian models, i.e.
Clarida et al. (2002), Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and Erceg, Gust, and Lpez-Salido
(2007). Clarida et al. (2002), Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) identify two channels through
which trade openness influences the monetary transmission mechanism: the terms of
trade (defined as the ratio of import price over export price, TOT henceforth) channel
and the marginal utility channel. When expansionary monetary policy shock depre-
ciates domestic currency, which raises TOT, foreign goods become more expensive.
The global demand shifts toward domestic goods and raises the domestic labor wage,
putting upward pressure on the domestic GDP deflator. On the other hand, do-
mestic currency depreciation has negative wealth effect on households and raises the
marginal utility, putting downward pressure on the domestic GDP deflator. Greater
openness strengthens the effects of both channels. The net effect of the influence
of greater openness on the effectiveness of monetary policy shock depends on model
calibration, i.e. the degree of substitutability of domestic and imported goods, and
the degree of risk aversion. Erceg et al. (2007) concludes that trade openness mainly
influences the composition of the consumption basket and the consumer price, rather
than stabilizes the responses of output and inflation.
In terms of model elements, this paper is related to the literature that incor-
porates heterogenous firms (following Melitz (2003)) into international macro model
and examine its implications on monetary policy. Schwerhoff and Sy (2014) highlights
25
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the disinflationary effect of the positive productivity effect associated with trade lib-
eralization. Cacciatore and Ghironi (2013) incorporates labor market frictions into
Ghironi and Melitz (2005). They show how the degree of trade integration influences
the incentive of optimal monetary policy: the trade liberalization induced produc-
tivity effect reduces the incentive to create positive inflation, which is necessary to
correct labor market distortions when trade integration is low.
Since this paper emphasize outsourcing a fraction of production to low wage coun-
try, it is related to Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan (2009), Burstein, Kurz, and Tesar
(2008), Johnson (2014), which use cross-country input trade linkages to solve the
trade-comovement puzzle. That is, country pairs, that are more integrated in trade,
exhibit higher output correlation. Among these papers, the closest to this one in terms
of model elements choice is Arkolakis and Ramanarayanan (2009), which is built on
Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Yi (2003), and extends the standard international
macro model with input trade across multiple stages of production. However, these
authors find little dependence of business cycle synchronization on trade intensity
under complete market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The
model calibration and business cycle properties are given in section 3. Section 4
analyzes the channels through which the trade openness and the financial openness
influence the monetary transmission mechanism, and conducts quantitative exercises
with the calibrated model. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2. Model
This section presents a dynamic, two-country model in a stochastic environment.
The two countries are asymmetric in the sense that the Home manufacturing sector
has a higher average technology level than the Foreign manufacturing sector does, and
Home manufacturing firms can fragment the production into a continuum of tasks
and offshore a fraction of them to Foreign, while Foreign manufacturing firms use
only domestic labor as inputs. The production structure of both countries is similar
to that in Obstfeld (2003), which features two-stage production. The first stage
produces traded manufactured goods and the second stage produces non-traded final
goods using manufactured goods as inputs. This paper builds on Eaton and Kortum
(2002)’s Ricardian trade model, where both comparative and absolute advantage play
a role in determining international trade pattern. The presence of absolute advantage,
a higher average technology level in the Home manufacturing sector, leads to a wage
gap between Home and Foreign, and generates the incentive for Home manufacturing
firms to offshore. Comparative advantage is the driving force of trade in absence of
fragmentation of production. The model of one-way offshoring is based on Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Rodrguez-Clare (2010), where expansion of offshoring
activities is driven by decline in the cost of importing intermediate goods.
In the model, Home and Foreign are identical except for the production technology
of the manufacturing sectors. Each country is populated by a continuum of households
of measure one, and consists of a representative retailer, a continuum of final-good-
producing firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], a continuum of manufacturing firms indexed by
j ∈ [0, 1], and a central bank. During each period, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., manufacturing firm
j produces a distinctive perishable intermediate good j and the final-good-producing
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firm i produces a distinct, perishable final good i using Home and imported Foreign
manufactured goods as inputs. The retailer assembles final goods into consumption
goods.
In this section, except for the manufacturing sector, I describe the behavior of
each agent focusing mainly on Home country, with the understanding that the Foreign
economy can be characterized using similar expressions. I mark the Foreign variables
with asterisk to distinguish them from Home variables. In the baseline model, the
two countries trade risk free bond. In order to analyze the effect of financial openness,
financial autarky is introduced at the end of this section.6 The detailed behavior rule
of each agent is given as following.
2.1. The Representative Household. At the beginning of each period, t =
0, 1, 2..., the household in Home starts with domestic bond Bt−1, and international
bond BI,t−1, where both Bt−1 and BI,t−1 are denominated using Home currency. The
household receives Bt−1 +BI,t−1 units of money when the domestic bond and Interna-
tional bond mature. Then, the household uses some money to purchase Bt+BI,t new
bond at the cost of Bt
rt
+
BI,t
it
+ ψPt
2it
(
BI,t
Pt
− B¯I
P
)2, where rt is the risk free nominal interest
rate between period t and t+1 in Home country, and it is the risk free nominal interest
rate of holding international bond. The quadratic adjustment cost of holding Foreign
bond is introduced in order to pin down a well defined steady state for consumption
and asset holding, and to ensure the model stationarity, following Benigno (2009)
and Ghironi, Lee, and Rebucci (2007). During each period, the household supplies
6Since the author’s simulation and the quantitative results of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003)
indicate that, under the first order log-linearization, the models under complete and incomplete
international financial market have similar implications. Here I omit the complete market scenario.
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ht units of labor to the manufacturing firms, and receives nominal wage Wt. The
household also purchases Ct units of consumption goods from retailers at price Pt,
and receives a lump-sum transfer Tt, which is the rebate of the international bond
trading cost in terms of consumption goods. At the end of each period, the household
receives Dt units of real profit from final-good-producing firms.
The household’s activities can be characterized by the optimization problem
max
{Ct,ht,Bt,BI,t}
E
∞∑
t=0
βt(
C1−σt
1− σ −
hηt
η
)
s.t. Ct +
Bt
rtPt
+
BI,t
itPt
+
ψ
2it
(
BI,t
Pt
− B¯I
P
)2 ≤ Wt
Pt
ht +
Bt−1
Pt
+
BI,t−1
Pt
+ Tt +Dt
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, σ ≥ 1 measures the degree of risk aversion,
η > 1 measures the elasticity of labor supply, and ψ measures the degree of frictions in
international financial intermediation. B¯I is the steady state holdings of international
bond, and P is the steady state price level.
The optimality conditions of the household include two inter-temporal optimality
conditions
βE[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
rt
pit+1
] = 1 (2.1)
βE[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
it
pit+1
] = 1 + ψ(
BI,t
Pt
− B¯I
P
) (2.2)
which links the household’s marginal rate of substitution to the real interest rates
of holding domestic bond and international bond, and one intra-temporal optimality
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condition
hη−1t C
σ
t =
Wt
Pt
(2.3)
which links the household’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
working hours to the real wage. The optimality conditions also include the budget
constraint with equality.
Similarly, Foreign household faces the budget constraint, which is given by
C∗t +
B∗t
r∗tP ∗t
+
B∗I,t
itP ∗t Et
+
ψ
2it
(
B∗I,t
P ∗t Et
− B¯
∗
I
P ∗E )
2 ≤ W
∗
t
P ∗t
h∗t +
B∗t−1
P ∗t
+
B∗I,t−1
P ∗t Et
+ T ∗t +D
∗
t (2.4)
where Et is nominal exchange rate, calculated as units of home currency per unit of
Foreign currency. The optimality conditions of holding domestic and international
bonds for Foreign household are given by
βE[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
r∗t
pi∗t+1
] = 1 (2.5)
βE[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
it
pi∗t+1
Et
Et+1 ] = 1 + ψ(
B∗I,t
EtP ∗t
− B¯
∗
I
P ∗E ) (2.6)
Due to the friction of trading international bond, the Uncovered Interest Rate
Parity is violated when the real holding of international bond deviates its steady
state level:
Et[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ(
it
pi∗t+1
Et
Et+1 −
r∗t
pi∗t+1
)] = ψ(
B∗I,t
EtP ∗t
− B¯
∗
I
P ∗E ) (2.7)
2.2. The Representative Retailer. During each period t = 0, 1, 2..., the rep-
resentative retailer purchases Yt(i) units of each type of final good at nominal price
Pt(i) to produce Yt units of the homogeneous consumption goods with constant return
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to scale technology, which is given by
Yt = [
∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
γ−1
γ di]
γ
γ−1 (2.8)
where γ > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution between different final goods. The
retailer sells the consumption goods in competitive market and maximizes profit by
choosing
Yt(i) = [
Pt(i)
Pt
]−γYt for i ∈ [0, 1], t = 0, 1, 2... (2.9)
The perfect competition drives the profit to zero, determining the price index
Pt = [
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−γdi]
1
1−γ for all t= 0, 1, 2... (2.10)
2.3. The Representative Final-Good-Producing Firm. During each pe-
riod, the final good producer i purchases y(i, j) units of manufactured good j from
perfect competitive international manufactured goods’ market, at nominal price pm(j)
to produce Yt(i) units of final good i with the constant return to scale technology
Yt(i) = [
∫ 1
0
yt(i, j)
µ−1
µ dj]
µ
µ−1 (2.11)
where µ > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution of manufactured goods. The final
good producer minimizes cost by choosing
yt(i, j) = [
pm,t(j)
Pm,t
]−µYt(i) for i, j ∈ [0, 1] and t = 0, 1, 2... (2.12)
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where Pm,t is the nominal price of the intermediate input bundle. The perfect compe-
tition in the international manufactured goods’ market drives the profit of the man-
ufacturing firms to zero, determining the nominal price of the Home manufactured
goods’ bundle, which is given by
Pm,t = [
∫ 1
0
pm,t(j)
1−µdj]
1
1−µ (2.13)
Since the final goods are imperfect substitutes in producing the consumption goods,
final goods are sold in monopolistic competitive market: During period t, the final
good producer i set price P (i) subjecting to the demand of the retailer at the given
price. The final good producer i sets price facing the Rotemberg (1984) type of
quadratic adjustment cost measure by the consumption goods, which is given by
φ
2
[
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)Π˜
− 1]2Yt (2.14)
where φ measures the magnitude of cost in response to the price adjustment, and Π˜
is the steady state level of inflation set by the central bank.
The final good producer i maximizes the market value of the firm by choosing the
nominal price Pt(i)
max
Pt(i)
E[
∞∑
t=0
βt
Dt(i)
Cσt
] (2.15)
where βt 1
Cσt
the household’s marginal utility gain from one unit of real profit. With
the demand of final good i equation 2.12, and the real marginal cost of the final good
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producer i, Pm,t
Pt
, the expression of the real profit is given by
Dt(i) = [
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−γYt − Pm,t
Pt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−γYt − φ
2
[
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)Π˜
− 1]2Yt (2.16)
The first order condition of optimally setting price is
(γ − 1)[Pt(i)
Pt
]−γ
Yt
Pt
=γ
Pm,t
Pt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−γ−1
Yt
Pt
− φ[ Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)Π˜
− 1] Yt
Π˜Pt−1(i)
+
βφE[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ[
Pt+1(i)
Pt(i)Π˜
− 1]Pt+1(i)
Pt(i)Π˜
Yt+1
Pt(i)
] (2.17)
2.4. The Representative Manufacturing Firm. During each period, t =
0, 1, 2..., representative Home manufacturing firm j fragments its production of man-
ufactured good ym,t(j) into a continuum of task, t(j, k) indicated by k ∈ Ωj. Ωj is
the set of all the tasks involved to produce good j, and it’s indexed by j to allow for
the variability of tasks cross manufacturing firms. The production function is given
by
ym,t(j) = zt(j)
∫
Ωj
tt(j, k)dk (2.18)
where zt(j) is the idiosyncratic technology shock to firm j. Following Eaton and
Kortum (2002), I assume zt(j) is a random draw from the Frechet distribution
F (z) = e−Ztz
−θ
(2.19)
where θ measures the dispersion of the idiosyncratic technology, and it’s the measure
of the comparative advantage within the continuum of manufactured goods: A lower
value of θ generates larger heterogeneity in terms of idiosyncratic technology within
a country, and the comparative advantage effect is greater. Zt is country specific
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aggregate technology shock, and determines the location of the idiosyncratic technol-
ogy shock’s distribution. Higher Zt implies that the idiosyncratic technology draw is
likely to be better, and it affects the share of goods in which Home has comparative
advantage relative to Foreign across the continuum of goods. It follows a stationary
autoregressive process:
ln(Zt) = (1− ρz) ln(µz) + ρz ln(Zt−1) + z,t (2.20)
where 0 < ρz < 1. µz is the steady state value of aggregate technology, Zt, and
it governs the average realization of idiosyncratic technology shocks, zt(j). z,t is
serial uncorrelated and follows the normal distribution with zero mean and standard
deviation σz.
Foreign representative manufacturing firm j hires h∗t (j) units labor from the rep-
resentative household to produce y∗m,t(j) units of good j with the constant return to
scale technology
y∗m,t(j) = z
∗
t (j)h
∗
t (j) (2.21)
where z∗t (j) is the idiosyncratic productivity of firm j and it’s a random draw from
Frechet distribution with aggregate technology, Z∗t . With the assumption, µz > µ
∗
z,
Home manufacturing firms have absolute advantage over their Foreign counterparts,
hence Home has higher wage than Foreign does, Wt > W
∗
t Et.
For Home manufacturing firm j, each task k can either be implemented by domes-
tic labor or by offshoring. Following Rodrguez-Clare (2010), offshoring task k involves
an iceberg cost, ζt(k), which is an independent draw from an exponential distribu-
tion with parameter λ, and a mass point at 1. Formally, given constant ζ¯ ≥ 1, the
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probability that the offshoring cost of task k is greater than ζ¯ ≥ 1 is
P (ζt(k) ≤ ζ¯) = F (ζ¯ , λ) = 1− exp(−λζ¯) (2.22)
where λ > 0. Higher λ implies a lower average offshoring cost. Let Ct(Wt, k) denote
the unit nominal cost of task k as a function of nominal wages, Wt ≡ (Wt,W ∗t Et). It
is given by
Ct(Wt, k) =

Wt ζt(k) >
Wt
W ∗t Et
ζt(k)W
∗
t Et 1 ≤ ζt(k) ≤ WtW ∗t Et
W ∗t Et ζt(k) < 1
Home manufacturing firm j will choose to offshore when offshoring cost is be-
low Wt
W ∗t Et , and the lowest possible offshoring cost is 1. With unit cost of each task,
Ct(Wt, k) specified, the nominal unit input cost of the representative manufacturing
firm j is given by
Ct(Wt) = W
∗
t EtF (1, λ) +
∫ Wt
W ∗t Et
xdF (x,
λ
W ∗t Et
) +Wt[1− F (Wt, λ
W ∗t Et
)] (2.23)
which indicates that firm j’s unit input cost is a weighted sum of Home labor cost,
Wt and Foreign labor cost, W
∗
t Et, and hence Wt > Ct(Wt) > W ∗t Et. Higher λ shifts
greater weight towards W ∗t Et.
Since both Home and Foreign manufacturing firms are able to produce all the
variety of manufactured goods, and Home made and Foreign made manufactured
goods j are perfect substitutes in producing the final goods, the manufactured goods
are sold in perfectly competitive international market. For Home final good producers,
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the available nominal prices of manfactured good j are
Home ph,m,t(j) =
Ct(Wt)
zt(j)
Foreign pf,m,t(j) =
W ∗t τEt
z∗t (j)
where τ > 1 for t = 0, 1, 2, ... is the iceberg trade cost. Due to the costly trade,
Purchasing Power Parity doesn’t hold in this model.
As the representative Home final good producer always chooses the cheaper source
of manufactured good j, the nominal price of the manufactured good j in Home coun-
try is pm,t(j) = min{ph,m,t(j), pf,m,t(j)} for all j ∈ [0, 1] and t = 0, 1, 2.... Following
Eaton and Kortum (2002)’s probabilistic approach, the nominal price index of man-
ufactured goods’ bundle Pm,t is given by
Pm,t = [ZtCt(Wt)
−θ + Z∗t (W
∗
t τEt)−θ]−
1
θ [Γ(
1− µ+ θ
θ
)]
1
1−µ (2.24)
where [Γ(1−µ+θ
θ
)]
1
1−µ > 0 is a constant. Recall that Pm,t is the representative final
good producer j’s nominal marginal cost. Due to international trade, the Home final
good producer’s marginal cost depends on: 1) Home labor cost, Wt, and aggregate
technology, Zt; 2) Foreign labor cost denominated in Home currency W
∗
t Et and aggre-
gate technology, Z∗t and 3) the trade cost τ . Progress in aggregate technology in either
country or decline in trade or labor cost in either country leads to a lower nominal
marginal cost in Home. As the trade cost declines, the Foreign factors has greater
effect on Home final-good producers marginal cost, and on Home CPI inflation as
well.
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Since there are a continuum ex ante identical manufacturing firms j ∈ [0, 1], by
Law of Large Numbers, the fraction of the manufactured goods that the Home final
good producers purchase from Home manufacturing firms, Sh,t, is the same as the
probability that the representative Home manufacturing firm j serves Home market,
that is the probability that firm j provides a lower price in Home market than the
Foreign manufacturing firm j does. Sh,t is given by
Sh,t =
ZtCt(Wt)
−θ
ZtCt(Wt)
−θ + Z∗t (W ∗t tτEt)−θ
(2.25)
Similarly, the Home intermediate-good-producing firms’ market share in Foreign mar-
ket, Sf,t is given by
Sf,t =
Zt[Ct(Wt)τ/Et]−θ
Zt[Ct(Wt)τ/Et]−θ + Z∗tW ∗t −θ
(2.26)
The above two equations imply that raising the Home marginal cost relative to Foreign
marginal cost evaluated using the same currency shifts the global demand towards
Foreign intermediate good. A lower trade cost promotes international trade, by reduc-
ing the price charged by exporters abroad, and hence expanding the range of traded
goods in both countries. With lower θ, the dispersion of idiosyncratic productivities
among intermediate good producers is greater in both countries, leading to a greater
comparative advantage effect to keep the trade pattern stable.
The perfect competition drives the profit of Home manufacturing firms to zero,
determining Home manufactured goods’ market clear condition:
Pm,tSh,tYt + P
∗
m,tSf,tY
∗
t Et = Ct(Wt)
ht
1− F (Wt, λW ∗t Et )
(2.27)
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which implies that the revenue of Home manufacture sector equals to the sum of the
payment to domestic labor and offshored labor services.
Foreign manufacturing goods’ market clear condition is given by
Pm,t(1− Sh,t)Yt + P ∗m,tEt(1− Sf,t)Y ∗t = W ∗t h∗tEt +Wtht − Ct(Wt)
ht
1− F (Wt, λW∗t Et )
(2.28)
which implies that Foreign manufacturing firms revenue is equal to the payment to
Foreign labor net the payment to offshored labor services.
2.5. Central Bank. In each country, the central bank conduct monetary policy
following standard Taylor rule proposed by Taylor (1993), augmented by the lagged
nominal interest rate.7
ln(rt)− ln(r) = ρr[ln(rt−1)− ln(r)] + ΦY Et[ln(YGDP,t)− ln(YGDP )] + ΦpiEt[ln(Πt])− ln(Π˜)] + r,t
where r,t is unforecastable random variable, which is interpreted as unexpected
monetary policy shock to period t nominal interest rate. r,t is serially uncorrelated
and it follows zero mean normal distribution with standard deviation σr . ρr measures
the persistency of the nominal interest rate and 0 < ρr < 1.
The policy rule implies Home central bank adjusts the short term nominal interest
rate according to the last period nominal interest rate, the expected deviation of real
GDP from its steady state level and the expected deviation of inflation from the
desired level. The monetary authority chooses magnitude of interest rates’ response
to inflation, measured by Φpi, the magnitude of interest rates’ response to output,
measured by ΦY . The
Φpi
1−ρr > 1 is a sufficient condition to ensure existence of a
unique nonexplosive rational expectation equilibrium.
7The federal funds rate is well-known for its persistency. This phenomenon may arise as Fed’s
interest rate smoothing motivation, or reflect the optimal policy under commitment
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2.6. Symmetric Equilibrium. In equilibrium, all the final-good-producing firms
behave in the identical way, therefore Yt(i) = Yt, Pt(i) = Pt and Dt(i) = Dt for all
i ∈ [0, 1] and t = 0, 1, 2...; and all the manufacturing firms behave in the same way ex
ante, ht(j) = ht, t(j, k) = tt, and their expected market shares in the global market
are the same. Denote real wage wt =
Wt
Pt
, real input cost of Home manufacturing
firms, ct(w) =
Ct(W)
Pt
, real marginal cost of final good producers, pm,t =
Pm,t
Pt
, real
domestic bond holdings bt =
Bt
Pt
and real international bond holding bI,t =
BI,t
Pt
.
The aggregate resource constraint can be written as
Ct +
bI,t
it
= wtht + bI,t−1 + Yt − pm,tYt − φ
2
(
Πt
Π˜
− 1)2Yt (2.29)
and the consumption goods’ market clear condition is given by
Ct = Yt − φ
2
(
Πt
Π˜
− 1)2Yt (2.30)
In equilibrium, the domestic bond is in zero net supply: bt = 0, and so is the inter-
national bond: bI,t + b
∗
I,t = 0. By definition, current account, cat is the sum of the
trade balance and net international investment income, which is given by
cat =
bI,t
it
− bI,t−1
it
= (1− 1
it
)bI,t−1 + wtht − pm,tYt (2.31)
The bond market equilibrium condition implies that cat = ca
∗
tQt. Hence, the
current account can also be expressed as
bI,t
it
− bI,t−1 =
wtht − w∗th∗tQt − pm,tYt + p∗m,tY ∗t Qt
2
(2.32)
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2.7. Financial Autarky. Since the international financial market structure cru-
cially affects the determination of real exchange rate, I also consider financial autarky
case, where there’s no international borrowing or lending between Home and Foreign.
Only domestic bond is traded in each country. The Home household’s budget con-
straint becomes,
Ct +
bt
rt
≤ wtht + bt−1 +Dt (2.33)
The inter-temporal optimality condition is the standard close economy Euler equation.
βE[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σrt
Pt
Pt+1
] = 1 (2.34)
Under Financial autarky, the inability to trade inter-temporally imposes that the
value of the imports must equal to the value of exports evaluated using the same
currency:
p∗m,tQtSf,tY
∗
t = pm,t(1− Sh,t)Yt + ct(wt)
ht
1− F (wt, λw∗tQt )
− wtht (2.35)
in which the left-hand side term is Foreign imports, the first term on the right-hand
side is Home imports of manufactured goods, and the last two terms on the right-
hand side measures the imports of offshored products. This trade balance condition
determines the the movement of real exchange rate.
The definition of equilibrium, the calculation of steady state and the log-linearized
model are given in Appendix A.3, A.4 and A.5.
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3. Calibration and Macro Dynamics
This section presents the impulse responses of the key macro variables in the model
to unexpected transitory technology shock and to unexpected transitory monetary
policy shock. To this end, I calibrate the parameters in the model, compute the
implied steady state values of the endogenous variables, and solve the first order log-
linearized model following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). The detailed analysis is
given as follows.
3.1. Calibration. Model calibration follows the standard choices from the lit-
erature. Periods are interpreted as quarters. The discount factor is set at β = 0.99
and the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution σ = 1, which are stan-
dard in quarterly business cycle models. I set η = 5 to match Frisch elasticity of
aggregate hours of 0.25, which is within the reasonable range of Frisch elasticity es-
timates suggested in Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011). The international
financial intermediate friction parameter is set at ψ = 0.01, in order to induce the
model stationarity, and to ensure a small enough effect of asset adjustment on the
model dynamic. I use the estimated value for trade elasticity from Simonovska and
Waugh (2014), to set the trade elasticity θ = 4. The elasticity of substitution of final
goods and the elasticity of intermediate goods are set using the estimated value from
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), γ = µ = 3.8.8 The adjustment cost
8As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), the model contains two parameters related to the elasticity of
substitution between the trade goods from two sources. µ governs substitutability in the intensive
margin within goods that are continuously traded, θ governs the heterogeneity in production tech-
nology across goods, and hence determines the extent to which the extensive margin of trade in
new goods responds to variations in production cost or trade costs. The role of the parameter µ in
determining the elasticity of trade is concealed by the role of θ. In our model, only θ influences the
model dynamics.
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parameter is set at φ = 33 to match the price adjustment frequency about one year,
which is the standard choice in models with sticky price, e.g. the Calve model. The
steady state inflation is set Π˜ = 1.0086, which implies a annual inflation of 3.48%
following Ireland (2004). The stance of monetary policy are set at Φpi = 1.5 and
ΦY = 0.5 following Taylor (1993), and set the persistency of nominal interest rate,
ρi = 0.76, and the persistency of the technology shock, ρz = 0.83, according to the
estimated values in Lubik and Schorfheide (2006). The trade cost τ and offshore cost
λ are set to match steady state import to GDP ratio at 17% and the ratio of material
offshore to import at 30% in Home country.9 The steady state values of Home aggre-
gate technology, µz is set at 1 and steady state values of Foreign aggregate technology,
µ∗z is set at 0.07 in order to target the ratio of real GDP between Home and Foreign
at 2.10
3.2. Real GDP and Productivity in the Model. Before proceeding to show-
ing the impulse responses of productivity and monetary policy shocks, let’s take a
detour to define the real GDP and the measured productivity (or TFP) in this model.
It’s necessary, because unlike the standard international business cycle models, in
which all value added is created in one-stage production, this model features two
stages of production. The real GDP is defined as the total real value of gross output
of each sector less the total real value of expenditure on intermediate inputs. The
9The measure of material offshore can be estimated following Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 1996).
30% is within the reasonable range of the ratio of intermediate imports to non-energy imports in
US manufacture sector.
10 It’s consistent with the ratio of GDP per capita in US to the mean of US dollar valued GDP per
capita in US top twenty five trade partners in 2000 according to the World Bank data.
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expression of real GDP is given by
YGDP,t = (1− pm,t)Yt − φ
2
(
Πt
Π˜
− 1)2Yt + wtht (3.1)
where the first two terms on right hand side of the equation are the real value added
of the final good sector, and the last term is the real value added of the manufacture
sector. That is, the real GDP is the sum of real value of the profit from the final-
good-producing sector, and the real wage payment to domestic households.
The average labor productivity is defined as the ratio of real GDP over labor
input:
At =
YGDP,t
ht
(3.2)
The movement of the measured productivity comes from three sources: 1) technology
progress in manufacture sector; 2) reallocation of resources among the manufacturing
firms with heterogeneous technology levels; 3) the variation of the manufactured in-
put bundle’s price, which influences the final-good-producing firms production cost.
The first channel is straightforward. The second channel arises because reallocation
of resources among firms with different technology shifts the size distribution of man-
ufacturing firms, hence changes the average technology level of intermediate good
sector. The third channel is associated with the offshoring induced productivity ef-
fect, which is analyzed in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Rodrguez-Clare
(2010). The following analysis provides concrete examples on how these three chan-
nels interact.
3.3. Macro Dynamics.
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3.3.1. Positive Technology Shock. Figure 2.1 shows the impulse responses of vari-
ables to an unexpected positive technology shock (positive one percent deviation) in
Home manufacturing sector, reflecting the increase in the average realization of the
idiosyncratic technology shocks of Home manufacturing firms. The blue solid lines are
the impulse responses of Home variables; the red dashed lines are impulse responses of
Foreign variables. In line with Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), technology progress moves
prices and quantities in opposite directions: real GDP and consumption rise, while
CPI inflation falls in Home. The Home monetary authority reacts to the falling infla-
tion by providing an easing monetary condition from the second period onward. The
lagged response of nominal interest rate leads to the hump-shaped response of real
GDP and consumption. Consistent with the empirical literature, e.g. Kimball et al.
(2006), the positive technology shock has a contractionary effect on hours, since the
improved production efficiency is more than sufficient to meet the short run moderate
increase in demand. The puzzling decline in Home real wage in the first period is due
to lack of nominal wage rigidity. The insufficient labor demand leads nominal wage
to fall. Given the presence of price stickiness, the real wage falls correspondingly.
Consistent with the recent empirical evidence, e.g. Enders et al. (2011) and
Corsetti et al. (2014), technology progress leads real exchange rate to appreciate.
The intuition is that a positive technology shock reduces the average production cost
of Home manufacturing firms, which facilitate them to expand Home and Foreign
market shares. This, in turn, increases the demand of Home labor relative to the
demand of Foreign labor, which raises Home labor wages above Foreign labor wages,
as evaluated with Home currency. The positive technology shock, on the other hand,
reduces the share of non-traded manufacturing-good-producing firms, leaving their
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average technology level less affected by the positive technology shock. Consequently,
the average production cost of Home non-traded manufacturing goods rises relative to
that of Foreign non-traded manufacturing goods. Hence, Home consumption goods
become more expensive than Foreign ones.11
Home technology shock has a negative spillover effect on the Foreign economy
in terms of real GDP, hours and real wage. It also leads to a temporary deflation.
In reaction, the Foreign central bank lowers the nominal interest rate and Foreign
consumption rises. Since the Foreign central bank lowers the nominal interest rate
by less than the Home central bank does, a capital inflow into Foreign occurs, which
causes Foreign consumption to rise more than the Home consumption does in the
initial one and a half years.
3.3.2. Expansionary Monetary Policy Shock. Figure 2.2 shows the impulse re-
sponses to unexpected expansionary monetary policy shock (negative one percent
deviation in nominal interest rate) in Home. The blue solid lines are the impulse
responses of Home variables; the red dashed lines are impulse responses of Foreign
variables. Expansionary monetary policy raises Home CPI inflation and consumption
demand. To accommodate the rising aggregate demand, Home final good producers
expand production, and Home aggregate hours and real GDP increase. Notably, for
one percent decrease in Home nominal interest rate, the Home real wage rises by
nearly six percent, which is larger than what structural VAR model suggests. This
large response of real wages is caused mainly by a lack of real wage rigidity, as well as
11This mechanism is in the same spirit as Ghironi and Melitz (2005): with an endogenously deter-
mined non-traded sector, when positive technology shock in Home raises Home labor wage relative to
Foreign labor wage, it raises Home non-traded goods prices above Foreign non-traded goods prices,
leading to real exchange rate appreciation.
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the relatively low labor supply elasticity of the model calibration choice. Moreover,
the expansionary monetary policy shock raises domestic average labor productiv-
ity.12 It raises domestic labor wage relative to Foreign labor wage, hence stimulates
offshoring activities, thus enhancing Home average labor productivity.
Expansionary monetary policy shock in Home has a negligible effect on Foreign
consumption and nominal interest rate, but has a positive spillover effect on Foreign
real GDP, hours and real wages. The positive demand shock in Home raises the
demand of Foreign manufactured good, driving up Foreign hours and real wage; while
raising the cost of manufacturing input bundle, thus driving down their profit. The
former channel dominates, and Foreign real GDP rises. Given the high persistence
of Foreign nominal interest rates and a moderate increase in Foreign CPI inflation,
Foreign nominal interest rate rises by a negligible amount, which boosts Foreign
consumption by little.
4. Globalization, Offshoring and Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
This section explores the mechanisms through which manufactured goods impor-
tation increases, offshoring activities expansion, and international financial market
liberalization influence the monetary transmission mechanism. The model is simu-
lated to quantify the combined effects of financial market liberalization and trade
liberalization on monetary transmission mechanism. Counterfactual analysis is con-
ducted to examine the interactions of different channels. Sensitivity analysis is pre-
sented at the end of this section.
12Basu (1995) provides a close economy model, which features using intermediate inputs in final
good’s production, monopolistic competition and sticky price to generate pro-cyclical productivity
effect with demand shock.
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4.1 The Mechanism: Role of Trade Integration
For simplicity, the technology shocks are shut off. The role of trade openness
in determining inflation dynamics can be analyzed with the New Keynesian Philips
Curve (NKPC henceforth), i.e. the log-linearized first order condition of final-good-
producing firms’ optimally choosing their target prices (equation 2.17). The percent-
age deviation of a variable from its steady state value is denoted by the variable with
hat. The expression of the NKPC is given by
Πˆt = βE[Πˆt+1] +
γ − 1
φ
[
cˆt(wt)
1 + τ−θ
+
τ−θ
1 + τ−θ
(wˆ∗t + Qˆt)] (4.1)
which implies that Home CPI inflation, Πˆt, depends on the joint dynamics of unit
input cost of Home manufacturing firms, cˆt(w), and that of Foreign manufacturing
firms, wˆ∗t + Qˆt. It differs from the standard close economy NKPC, since Foreign
labor cost affects Home CPI inflation. Given
d( 1
1+τ−θ )
dτ
> 0, as trade cost τ falls, the
Home production cost has weaker effects on domestic CPI inflation.13 Moreover, the
log-linearized unit input cost of Home manufacturing firms is given by
cˆt(wt) =
we−
λw
w∗Q
c(w)
wˆt +
w∗Q(1− e−λ − λe−λ) + ∫ w
w∗Q(
λx
w∗Q )e
− λx
w∗Q ( λxw∗Q − 1)dx+ λw
2
w∗Qe
− λw
w∗Q
c(w)
(wˆ∗t + Qˆt)
(4.2)
It shows that the unit input cost of Home manufacturing firms is the weighted sum of
Home and Foreign real wages, and that the weights depend on the offshoring cost mea-
sure, λ. Recall that λ governs the average realization of the idiosyncratic offshoring
13Recent literature studying the open economy New Keynesian Philips Curve also find that openness
weakens the connection of domestic inflation and domestic production cost (Benigno and Faia (2010),
Guerrieri et al. (2010) and Razin and Loungani (2005)).
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costs, and higher λ indicates a lower average offshoring cost. The relationship be-
tween trade openness, which is governed by trade cost, τ , as well as offshoring cost,
λ, and the elasticities of Home manufacturing firms’ unit input cost and Home CPI
inflation with respect to Home and Foreign real wages is given in Figure 2.3. These
two figures imply that decline in offshoring cost reduces the impact of Home real
wages on Home manufacturing firms’ unit input cost, and the simultaneous decline
in offshoring and trade costs weakens its effects on Home CPI inflation. This trade
openness induced change in consumer price composition is referred to as the cost
composition effect, which is the first channel through which trade openness influences
the monetary transmission mechanism.
Since the NKPC indicates that the effect of monetary policy shock on inflation
depends on how Home and Foreign labor costs reaction to monetary policy distur-
bances, the analysis proceeds with a focus on the labor market. The log-linearized
Home (Foreign) manufactured goods’ market clear condition yields the Home (For-
eign) labor demand condition. The derivation is given in the Appendix A.6. Home
and Foreign hours worked depend on domestic and foreign real wages, real exchange
rate and global consumption demand. Figure 2.4 shows how trade openness influ-
ences the elasticities of Home and Foreign labor demand with respect to these four
variables. Greater trade integration, measured by the simultaneous decline in trade
cost and offshoring cost, raises the labor demand elasticities with respect to Home
and Foreign real wage, and strengthens the global demand spillover. These are the
second and third channels, through which trade openness influences the monetary
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transmission mechanism. The effects of trade integration on labor demand elastici-
ties are asymmetric between Home and Foreign: The less developed country is more
severely affected.
It is straightforward that greater trade openness induced by falling trade cost or
offshoring cost leads to greater demand spillover effect, since both changes strengthen
the linkage of domestic demand and foreign production. A trade cost decline and an
offshoring cost decline have different implications for labor demand elasticities. A
trade cost decline promotes product market competition, thus raising labor demand
elasticity. An offshoring cost decline raises labor demand elasticity by facilitating
domestic producers to substitute domestic labor with imported goods and services.
At the same time, it also enhances domestic producers competitiveness in global
market by reducing their production cost, which in turn raises their willingness to hire
domestic labor to expand production. This efficiency gain effect reduces labor demand
elasticity, and also dampens the demand spillover effect induced by the offshoring cost
reduction.
Figure 2.5 reveals the quantitative implications of offshoring-induced productivity
effect. The first row compares two scenarios of the effects of trade openness on the
labor demand elasticities with respect to the four variables: 1) trade growth driven
by the simultaneous declines of trade and offshoring costs, and 2) trade growth driven
by the decline of trade cost only. Under both scenarios, greater trade openness drives
up labor demand elasticities with respect to domestic wage, and leads to greater
international demand spillover. These effects are dampened by the offshoring-induced
productivity effect. The second and third rows of Figure 2.5 compare the effects of
offshoring on the labor demand elasticities with respect to the four variables under
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two trade openness regimes. When the trade openness is low (high trade cost), the
offshoring cost decline raises labor demand elasticity, but when trade openness is
high (low trade cost), the offshoring cost decline reduces labor demand elasticity.
The lower trade cost promotes the manufactured goods’ market competition, hence
magnifies the productivity effect associated with offshoring activities.
Since greater trade openness raises labor demand elasticity with respect to do-
mestic labor wage and enhances international demand spillover, it lowers the effects
of demand shock on domestic real wage and hours worked. Intuitively, this labor
demand elasticity increase implies that for a given increase in hours worked, the real
wages rise by less. The greater demand spillover indicates that, for a given monetary
expansion, the given increase in consumption demand in Home has weaker effects on
Home hours worked. The combined effect of increased labor demand elasticity and
strengthened effects of global demand spillover lead to subdued responses of real wage
and hours worked to domestic demand shock.
4.2 Role of Financial Market Integration
International financial market integration reduces the responses of real exchange
rate to exogenous disturbances, thereby dampening the effects of demand shock on
domestic real wages and hours worked. To be more specific, when Home monetary
expansion depreciates real exchange rate, the final-good producer level expenditure
switching effect puts an upward pressure on Home real wage and hours worked. In-
ternational financial market liberalization weakens the expenditure switching effect,
hence lowers the upward pressure of monetary expansion on real wages and hours
worked.
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In sum, the above analysis indicates that international financial market and trade
market integration reduces the effects of demand shock on domestic real wage and
hours worked, while strengthening this integration’s effects on Foreign real wage and
hours worked. The cost composition effect implies that trade integration reduces the
CPI inflation’s exposure to domestic real wage, while raises its exposure to foreign
real wage. The following analysis quantifies the interactions of these channels.
4.3 Quantitative Results
Figure 2.6 presents the impulse responses of the model to expansionary monetary
policy shock (a negative one percent deviation in nominal interest rate) in Home
under two extreme trade and international financial market openness regimes: The
economy moves from nearly trade trade autarky and financial autarky to post 2005
trade regime and incomplete international financial market.14 Increased international
trade and financial openness weakens the effects of monetary policy disturbances on
domestic inflation, real GDP, hours worked and real wages, and magnifies its effects on
Foreign variables. The case 1 column in the upper left section of Table 2.1 quantifies
the percentage changes of the peaks of impulse responses of these four variable. When
trade liberalization is accompanied by international financial market liberalization,
effects of monetary policy changes on output and inflation are dampened by 22%.
The other three columns in the upper left section of Figure 2.1 report the percent-
age changes of the peak impulse responses of output, inflation, real wages and hours
worked from low trade openness regime to high trade openness regime under three
14Under post 2005 trade regime, values of trade cost τ , and the offshoring cost λ are chosen to match
the import to GDP ratio at 17% and the intermediate imports to general imports at 30%, which
corresponds to US trade pattern in 2005.
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scenarios. Case 2 implies that under an incomplete international financial market,
when the simultaneous decline in trade and offshoring costs moves the economy from
nearly trade autarky to post 2005 trade regime, the effects of monetary policy shock
on output and inflation are 15% lower. In case 3, the growth of trade is driven by
the decline in trade cost alone. Comparing the results from case 2 and case 3 reveals
that due to the induced productivity effect, offshoring can weaken the effects of trade
openness on the output elasticity with respect to monetary policy shock. Yet, under
baseline calibration, this effect is quantitatively small. Case 4 shows that under fi-
nancial autarky, the effects of trade openness on the output elasticity with respect to
monetary policy shock are negligible.
4.4 Robustness
Table 2.1 reports the quantitative results of the aforementioned four groups of
exercise under three alternative sets of calibrations, with one parameter value changed
in each set. The changed parameters are labor supply elasticity, the household’s risk
aversion coefficient and the trade elasticity, since the labor supply elasticity and the
household’s risk aversion coefficient affect the responsiveness of real wage and hours
worked to demand changes, and trade elasticity affects the responsiveness of trade
flow to relative production costs between two countries. These alternative parameter
choices are given by: σ = 6.37 following Woodford (2007), η = 2.33 following Chetty
et al. (2011), and θ = 1 given that international macro literature tends to choose a
low trade elasticity.
The model’s qualitative implications on the connection of trade openness and ef-
fectiveness of monetary policy are not affected by these changed calibration choices.
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The greater risk aversion and higher labor supply elasticity leads to lower volatility
of the economy in response to demand shocks, hence the differences of the impulse
responses to monetary shocks are smaller. With the changed risk aversion and labor
supply elasticity, the decline in offshoring cost still weakens the effects of trade open-
ness on output elasticity with respect to monetary policy shocks, since according to
the first two rows of Figure 2.7, trade openness that involves offshoring leads labor
demand elasticity to increase by less and a weaker international demand spillover.
The relative quantitative effects of the trade openness induced by falling trade
cost, and the trade openness induced by falling offshoring cost can, nevertheless, differ
according to the choice of trade elasticity. Under low trade elasticity, a simultaneous
decline in trade cost and offshoring cost is more stabilizing for both output and
inflation than the decline in trade cost alone does, since low trade elasticity implies
greater complementarity among traded goods. Exporters’ market shares are less
affected by relative production cost, thereby limiting the offshoring cost reduction
induced efficiency gain effect on output. The third row of Figure 2.7 provides the
supportive evidence for this analysis, by showing that, under lower trade elasticity,
trade openness that involves offshoring leads to a greater increase in labor demand
elasticity and a greater demand spillover. When trade elasticity is low, the decline
in offshoring cost magnifies the effects of trade openness on output elasticity with
respect to monetary policy shocks.
5. Conclusion
This paper establishes a new fact that greater trade openness weakens the effects of
the monetary policy changes on the industry-level output. The empirical analysis also
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suggests that the involvement of offshoring activities doesn’t necessarily strengthens
the impact of trade openness on the the effects of monetary policy changes. Based on
these evidence, this paper provides an open economy New Keynesian model, which
features heterogeneous manufacturing firms and one-wage offshoring from the ad-
vanced economy to the less developed one. The model implies that trade openness
weakens the effects of monetary policy changes through dampening the responses of
domestic labor market to monetary policy shocks. A simultaneous decline in trade
cost and offshoring raises labor demand elasticity, while due to the offshoring induced
productivity effect, when trade cost is low enough, the decline in offshoring cost alone
reduces labor demand elasticity. This provides a possible explanation for the am-
biguous role of offshoring status in determining the strength of the effects of trade
openness on the effectiveness of monetary policy. The calibrated model shows that
trade openness or financial openness weakens the effects of monetary policy changes,
and the general equilibrium effect of the offshoring induced productivity effect is
small.
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Figure 2.1. Impulse responses of the model in response to unex-
pected positive technology shock.
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Figure 2.2. Impulse responses of the the model in response to un-
expected expansionary monetary policy shock.
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Figure 2.3. Elasticity of CPI Inflation w.r.t. Domestic and Foreign
Labor Costs
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Note: The figure on the left shows the elasticity of Home manufacturing firms’ unit
input cost with respect to Home and Foreign real wages as functions of trade cost and
offshoring cost. The figure on the right shows the elasticity of Home CPI inflation
with respect to Home and Foreign real wages as functions of trade cost and offshoring
cost. The X axis ticks from 0 to 5 correspond to six combinations of import to real
GDP ratio and intermediate imports to total imports ratio, [(0.5%,0.5%), (3%, 3%),
(6%, 12%), (10%, 17%), (15%, 28%), (21%, 37%)].
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Figure 2.4. Labor Demand Elasticities: Baseline
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(3%, 3%), (6%, 12%), (10%, 17%), (15%, 28%), (21%, 37%)].
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Table 2.1. Quantitative Results Table
Baseline σ = 6.37
Variables Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Output Y -0.2249 -0.1515 -0.1546 -0.0011 -0.1312 -0.0955 -0.097 -0.0021
Inflation Π -0.2203 -0.1468 -0.1452 0.0387 -0.1384 -0.0773 -0.0764 0.0141
Hours Worked h -0.3271 -0.2272 -0.2256 0.0441 -0.0679 -0.0606 -0.0695 0.0388
Real Wage w -0.2597 -0.1738 -0.1725 0.0351 -0.1489 -0.0891 -0.0873 0.0137
η = 2.33 θ = 1
Variables Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Output Y -0.2005 -0.1644 -0.1674 -0.001 -0.1539 -0.1089 -0.0915 -0.0037
Inflation Π -0.1307 -0.1005 -0.1025 0.0383 -0.1379 -0.0758 -0.0595 0.1717
Hours Worked h -0.2709 -0.2264 -0.2278 0.043 -0.212 -0.129 -0.1033 0.2021
Real Wage w -0.1649 -0.1306 -0.1313 0.0241 -0.1677 -0.0994 -0.0795 0.1611
Note: This table reports the percentage changes of the listed variables’ peak impulse responses
from low trade openness regime to high trade openness regime. The exercise is conducted using
four different sets of calibrations: the baseline calibration and changing the calibrated values of risk
aversion coefficient σ, the measure of labor supply elasticity η, and the trade elasticity θ, one for each
time. ’Case 1’ compares the results of the model under financial autarky and import to GDP ratio
at 1% as well as no intermediate imports, and the results of the model under incomplete market and
import to GDP ratio at 17% as well as the intermediate imports to total imports ratio at 30%. ’Case
2’ compares the results of the model under incomplete market and import to GDP ratio at 1% as
well as no intermediate imports, and the results of the model under incomplete market and import
to GDP ratio at 17% as well as the intermediate imports to total imports ratio at 30%. ’Case 3’
compares the results of the model under incomplete market and import to GDP ratio at 1% as well
as no intermediate imports, and the results of the model under incomplete market and import to
GDP ratio at 17% as well as no intermediate imports. ’Case 4’ corresponds to model under financial
autarky and import to GDP ratio at 1% as well as no intermediate imports, and the results of the
model under financial autarky and import to GDP ratio at 17% as well as the intermediate imports
to total imports ratio at 30%.
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CHAPTER 3
Import Competition and Changing U.S. Manufacturing
Employment Structural Dynamics
1. Introduction
U.S. labor market during the past three recessions has witnessed two new phenom-
ena. Firstly, job losses mainly concentrate among the middle-skill workers, while the
recovery of the middle-skill jobs is slow and a large fraction of the losses is permanent,
e.g. Foote and Ryan (2015) and Jaimovich and Siu (2012). Secondly, the recovery
of employment is slower than that in previous cases, e.g. Gal´ı, Smets, and Wouters
(2012). Both phenomena suggest that U.S. labor market may undergo structural
changes.
As an important component of U.S. labor force, manufacturing employees have
experienced similar changing dynamics since 1990. Figure 3.1 shows the total man-
ufacturing employees, production-nonsupervisory employees and total employees mi-
nus production-nonsupervisory employees from 1959 to 2015. This paper refer the
last group as non-production employees, which include low-skilled service employees
and managerial employees. Both types of manufacturing employees experienced rapid
recovery in pre-1990 recessions, while their recovery is much slower in post-1990 reces-
sions, and the recovery has never been fully achieved. In addition, starting from early
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2000s the total manufacturing employees exhibit a significant downward trend which
is mainly driven by the decline in the production and nonsupervisory employees.
This paper seeks to provide a detailed analysis of the evolution of the manufac-
turing employment’s structural dynamics. It estimates the time-varying elasticities
of industry-level employees, production and non-production employees with respect
to demand, supply as well as monetary policy shocks, and relates these elasticities to
industry characteristics in order to further explore the determinants of the structural
dynamics of industry-level employees.
The empirical model is a factor augmented structural vector autoregressive model
with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility (TVP-FAVAR). The model
specification is essentially the same as that in Baumeister, Liu, and Mumtaz (2013)
and Ellis, Mumtaz, and Zabczyk (2014), while these two papers focus mainly on
disaggregate price dynamics in U.S. (Baumeister et al. (2013)) and U.K. (Ellis et al.
(2014)).
This paper estimates the TVP-FAVAR model instead of the TVP-VAR model
for two reasons. Firstly, as it is stated in Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005)(BBE
henceforth) and Benati and Surico (2009), omitted-variable problem can potentially
lead to a substantial bias in estimating the effect of monetary policy changes on the
real economy using a small or medium scale VAR model. In addition, the measure-
ment error associated with the variables included in the VAR system can also reduce
the precision of the estimated dynamic relationships. FAVAR framework provides a
possible solution to these problems by incorporating extra information to the VAR
system in the form of common factors, which extracts information from a large panel
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of economic data. Secondly, the specification of the FAVAR provides a convenient
framework to analyze structural dynamics of industry-level data.
There has been a growing literature that scrutinizes various aspects of changing
structural dynamics of the U.S. economy. Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri
(2005) estimated small scale time-varying parameter VAR models, which include in-
flation, unemployment and short-term interest rate. Both find clear evidence that the
autoregression coefficients, and the variance of the disturbances have changed. Cog-
ley and Sargent (2005) shows that the inflation persistency has increased. Primiceri
(2005) finds monetary policy has reacted more aggressively to fluctuations in macro
fundamentals, but plays a minor role in explaining the less effectiveness monetary
policy since 1980s, when compared with changing volatility of structural shocks. Gal´ı
and Gambetti (2009) documents the changed structural dynamics of hours and labor
productivity to technology shocks and non-technology shocks. All this evidence on
the changing structural dynamics of aggregate macro series motivates this paper to
estimate FAVAR with time varying parameters instead of constant ones.
In terms of methodology, this paper is related with Negro and Otrok (2008), which
is the first to incorporate time-varying factor loadings and stochastic volatility into
a dynamic factor model. They use the model to study the evolution in international
business cycles, and report a decline in the volatility across a panel of 19 countries.
Benati and Surico (2009) uses time-varying parameter FAVAR to explore the evolution
of inflation in thirteen industrial countries.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the
econometric model and its estimation algorithm. Section 3 lists the sources of the
data. Section 4 discusses the directions of future works.
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2. Empirical Methodology
This section describes the TVP-FAVAR model, the structural shocks’ identifica-
tion strategy and the estimation procedures.
2.1. The Empirical Model. The time-varying parameter FAVAR model has
the standard state space representation. The observation equation relates the vector
of informational variables, Xt, to the vector of common factors, Ct, which is given by
Xt = ΦCt + θt (2.1)
where Xt is an N × 1 vector. The informational variables include measures on real
activities, asset prices, inflation and industry-level employment in U.S. manufacturing
sector. The vector of common factors Ct is (K+1)×1, and it contains K latent factors
Ft = [F1,t, · · · , FK,t]T , and an observable factor, Yt. As in BBE, the observable factor
is the federal funds rate, since both the econometrician and the monetary authority
can observe the federal funds rate, and regard it as a measurement of monetary policy
stance. That is Ct = [F1,t, · · · , FK,t, Yt]T . Φ is a N×(K+1) matrix of factor loadings.
The error term θt is a N × 1 vector that follows a multivariate normal distribution
N(0, G). Since θi,t, for i = 1, · · · , N , are assume to be independent across equations,
G is a diagonal matrix.
The transitional equation is a second order VAR with time varying parameters
and a time varying variance covariance matrix for the innovation terms, which is given
by
Ct = β1,tCt−1 + β2,tCt−2 + µt (2.2)
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where βi,t, for i = 1 and 2, are (K+1)×(K+1) matrices of time varying coefficients. µt
is a (K+1)×1 vector of heteroskedastic shocks with time varying variance covariance
matrix Ωt, which can be factorized as
Ωt = A
−1
t ΣtΣ
′
t(A
−1
t )
′ (2.3)
where At is a lower triangular matrix with ones along its diagonal, and Σt is a diagonal
matrix with standard deviation of structural disturbances along its diagonal and zeros
elsewhere. With this decomposition, the transition equation can be rewritten as
Ct = β1,tCt−1 + β2,tCt−2 + A−1t Σtt (2.4)
Let Bt be a 2(K + 1)
2× 1 vector that collects all the elements in βi,t for i = 1 and 2,
αt be a
K(K+1)
2
× 1 vector that collects all the non-zero elements of At, and σt be
a (K + 1) × 1 vector that collects the diagonal elements of Σt. Following Primiceri
(2005), these time varying parameters evolve as random walks
Bt = Bt−1 + νt (2.5)
αt = αt−1 + ξt (2.6)
log(σt) = log(σt−1) + ηt (2.7)
All the innovations in equations 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.6 and 2.7 are assumed to be serially
uncorrelated and jointly normally distributed with the variance covariance matrix
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given by
V = var


θt
t
νt
ξt
ηt


=

G 0N×(K+1) 0N×M 0N×(K+1) 0N×(K+1)
0(K+1)×N IK+1 0(K+1)×M 0(K+1)×(K+1) 0(K+1)×(K+1)
0M×N 0M×(K+1) Q 0M×(K+1) 0M×(K+1)
0(K+1)×N 0(K+1)×(K+1) 0(K+1)×M S 0(K+1)×(K+1)
0(K+1)×N 0(K+1)×(K+1) 0(K+1)×M 0(K+1)×(K+1) W

where 0m,n is m × n dimension matrix of zeros, M = 2(K + 1)2, and IK+1 is a
K + 1 dimension identity matrix. G, Q, S and W are positive semidefinite matrices.
The assumptions on S and W are the same as those in Primiceri (2005): S is block
diagonal and W is a diagonal matrix.
2.2. Estimation Procedure. The model estimation uses standard MCMC tech-
niques, and it takes three steps. The first step is to take factors as given and estimate
the transition equation 2.4. This boils down to estimating a time-varying parameter
VAR using the method that is outlined in Primiceri (2005). The coefficients of the
transition equation, Bt, and the off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix, αt are
simulated using multi-move Gibbs sampling method, that is developed in Carter and
Kohn (1994). The simulation of the volatility parameters follows Kim et al. (1998),
using seven mixture of normals to approximate the log of Chi-squared distribution of
the residual terms in the transformed observation equation.
The next step is to draw the hyperparameters {Φ, G,Q, S,W} from their respec-
tive posterior distributions. Φ follows normal distribution, G follows inverse Gamma
distribution, and Q, S, W follow inverse-Wishart Distribution. The last step is to
simulate factors in line with BBE and Kim and Nelson (1999).
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2.3. Identification of Structural Shocks. Given the estimated time-varying
VAR equation 2.4, one can calculate the monthly impulse responses of common factors
Ct = [F1,t, · · · , FK,t, Yt]T , which are denoted as CˆJt+s = [Fˆ J1,t+s, · · · , Fˆ JK,t+s, Yˆ Jt+s]T ,
where s is the horizon and J indicates the type of structural shock. Once these are
available, it’s straightforward to compute the time-varying impulse responses of all
the informational variables with the observation equation 2.1, which is given by
XˆJ1,1,t+s
...
XˆJN,1,t+s
Yˆ Jt+s

=

Φ1,1 · · · Φ1,K+1
...
. . .
...
ΦN,1 · · · ΦN,K+1
01,K+1 1

×

Fˆ J1,t+s
...
Fˆ JK,t+s
Yˆ Jt+s

Due to the presence of time-varying parameters in the VAR equation, the com-
putation of the impulse responses has to take into account the uncertainty associated
with drifting parameters in the VAR equation over the impulse response horizon.
The formula to compute impulse response of the variables in the transition equation
is given by
E[Ct+s|Θt+s, δJt ]− E[Ct+s|Θt+s] (2.8)
where Θt = {Bt, αt, σt, Q, S,W} contains all the parameters in the VAR equation,
and δJ is a type J structural shock. Equation 2.8 computes the expectation of the
deviation of endogenous variable C driven by structural shock δJt conditional on time-
varying parameters. The conditional expectations are calculated using Monte Carlo
integration for 1,000 replications of Gibbs sampler, which is outlined in Koop et al.
(1996).
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This paper uses sign-restriction identification scheme to identify three structural
shocks: an aggregate demand shock, an aggregate supply shock, and a monetary
policy shock. As a structural shock identification strategy, sign restrictions were first
introduced by Faust (1998) and Uhlig (2005) to identify monetary policy shocks, and
is widely used in more recent literature to identified other types of shocks, such as
aggregate supply shocks, oil shocks, and exchange rate shocks, e.g. Peersman and
Straub (2009) and Hau and Rey (2004).
The theoretical motivation of the sign restriction in this paper is a standard NK
model, which is estimated using maximum likelihood, as described in Ireland (2004).
The model implied restrictions on the contemporaneous impulses of the model to
three structural shocks are: 1) positive aggregate demand shocks raise the growth
of industrial production, CPI inflation and federal funds rate; 2) positive supply
shocks raise the growth of industrial production, while drives down CPI inflation,
which results in an ambiguous effect on federal funds rate; 3) Expansionary monetary
policy shocks, which leads to a decrease in federal funds rate has positive effect on
the growth of industrial production and CPI inflation. These sign restrictions are
summarized in Table 3.1.
The way to apply these sign restrictions is as following. We can draw a (K +
1) × (K + 1) matrix from multivariate normal distribution N(0K+1,1, I(K+1)×(K+1)),
and take a QR decomposition of this matrix to get a orthonormal rotation matrix
P that satisfies PP ′ = I. Let A˜t = A−1t P . Given equation 2.3, we now have Ωt =
A˜tΣtΣ
′
t(A˜t)
′. This household transformation provides an infinite many candidate
impulse responses. We can examine if these impulse responses satisfy sign restrictions.
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If they do, the rotation matrix Pt will be stored. This procedure is repeated until we
have collect 100 rotation matrices.
3. Data Description
This paper uses two balanced monthly panel data of U.S. economy to estimate
the time-varying parameter FAVAR model. The data series run from January 1990
to October 2005. The choice of the starting date reflects the date, from which most
of the monthly industry-level employment data become available. The ending date is
confined by the availability of macro indicators that are used in BBE. All the data
are transformed into stationary time series.
BBE contains 111 series of macro indicators, which include measures on output,
employment, asset prices and interest rates. The two datasets expand BBE by in-
cluding industry-level employee data in Employment, Hours and Earnings dataset,
which is collected by BLS Current Employment Statistics (CES) program, and can
be downloaded from Econ Stats website. The first dataset augment BBE macro indi-
cators with 24 ’All Employees’ data series, and in total, it has 135 series. The 24 ’All
Employees’ data series cover 60% of manufacturing sector employees over the sample
period. The second dataset adds 18 ’Production and Nonsupervisory Employees’ se-
ries, and 18 non-production employee series to BBE macro indicators, and it totally
includes 147 data series. The detailed list of the data series is given in the Appendix
C.
The data that are used to construct industry characteristic measures, i.e. capital
stock and capital expenditure, are obtained from NBER-CES dataset. The industry-
level openness measures are obtained from NBER international trade and finance
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dataset.
4. Future Works
A possible direction of future work is to compare the evolution of structural dy-
namics of production employees and non-production employees, since job polarization
literature, e.g. Foote and Ryan (2015) and Jaimovich and Siu (2012) as well as the
rough Figure 3.1 reveals that these two types of employees exhibit different dynamic
pattern. Since industry characteristic crucially determines the nature of the structural
changes an industry experiences, these potential diverse responses of industry-level
production and non-production employees with respect to structural shocks can be
related to industry characteristic measures.
Figure 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 present an example on how labor-intensity1 influences the
dynamics of total, production as well as non-production employees. For all types
of employees, employees in labor-intensive industries tend to exhibit more dramatic
changes in dynamic pattern over the sample period than those in capital intensive
industries do. This echoes the findings in recent empirical literature, that import
competition from China has induced plants to shift from labor-intensive industries
to capital intensive ones, and in the meanwhile removes middle-skill jobs, Pierce and
Schott (2012).
1The detailed list of industries that belong to labor intensive industries is given in Table C.1
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Table 3.1. Sign Restrictions
Shocks IP Growth CPI Growth. Federal Funds Rate.
Demand Shocks + + +
Supply Shocks + -
Monetary Policy Shocks + + -
Note: IP stands for Industrial Production.
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Figure 3.2. Manufacturing Total Employees
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Figure 3.3. Manufacturing Production Non-supervisory Employees
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Figure 3.4. Manufacturing Non-production Employees
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Trade Liberalization and Effectiveness of Monetary Policy:
Industry-Level Evidence
1. Data Description
The industry-level output measure is the industry-level total value added from
NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database, which provides annual data for 459
industries at the 4-digit SIC level for the sample period in this paper, from 1972 to
2005. To construct the measure of offshoring, this paper also uses material cost of
each sector from this dataset. The two openness measures are
Import Penetration Ratioi =
∑
t Importsi,t∑
t Shipmentsi,t − Exportsi,t + Importsi,t
Offshoringi =
∑
t Non-energy Intermediate Importsi,t∑
t Material Costi,t
where subscript i indicates industry i and subscript t indicates year t.
The measures for imports, value of shipments and exports are available for 458
industries at the 4-digit SIC level in ’low-age country share’ dataset on Peter Schott’s
website. The non-energy intermediate imports’ measure is constructed following
Schott (2004) using 10 digit HS level U.S. import data.
The summary statistics of the openness measures are given in Table 1.1. The
reason why the sample size is smaller than 458 is that industries that have 1) inter-
mediate imports more than total imports, 2) exports larger than value of shipment
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and 3) non-stationary estimated VAR are dropped from the sample. The remaining
sample accounts for around 95% of total manufacturing employment.
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Globalization, Offshoring and Monetary Control
1. Trade Pattern and Intermediate Good Price Index
Given intermediate-good producers’ idiosyncratic productivity following Frechet
distribution, I can get that a home intermediate good producer j presents domestic
market with the price distribution Gh,t(p):
Gh,t(p) = Pr{ph,m,t < pt}
= Pr{Ct(Wt)
Ztzt(i)
< pt}
= 1− e−Zt[Ct(Wt)pt ]−θ
The price distribution of Foreign good i in home market is given by
Gf,t(pt) = 1− e−Z
∗
t [
W∗t Etτ
pt
]−θ
Given that pt(i) is the price of good i in home market unless both sources charge
price higher than pt(i), the price distribution of good i in home market is
Gt(p) = [1−Gh,t(p)][1−Gf,t(p)]
= e{−Zt[
Ct(Wt)
p
]−θ−Z∗t [
W∗t Etτ
p
]−θ}
= e−φt[p]
θ
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where φt = ZtCt(Wt)
−θ + Z∗t (W
∗
t τEt)−θ. φ is critical to subsequent analysis. It
summarizes how 1) labor costs, 2) technology statuses, and 3) trade costs in both
countries affect price distribution of home intermediate goods. International trade
provides a channel for Foreign factors to influence domestic prices.
Recall that the price index Pm,t given by equation 2.24,
Pm,t = [
∫ 1
0
pm,t(j)
1−µdj]
1
1−µ
= [
∫ ∞
0
p1−µdGt(p)]
1
1−µ
= [
∫ ∞
0
p1−µde−φt[p]
θ
]
1
1−µ
= [
∫ ∞
0
p1−µ+θ(−φt)exdx
x
]
1
1−µ
= [
∫ ∞
0
φ
µ−1
θ
t x
1−µ+θ
θ ex
dx
x
]
1
1−µ
= φ
− 1
θ
t Γ(
1− µ+ θ
θ
)
1
1−µ
where x = −φtpθ, and Γ() > 0 is Gamma function,1 and Γ(1−µ+θθ ) is a constant.
I can get the Foreign material good bundle in the similar way, which is given by
P ∗m,t = [ZtCt(Wt)
−θ + Z∗t (W
∗
t τEt)−θ]−
1
θ [Γ(
1− µ+ θ
θ
)]
1
1−µ
Since there are a continuum of intermediate goods/ producers, the probability
that a home producer provides the lower price in home (Foreign) market is the same
as the home producer’s share in home (Foreign) market. Then the home producers’
1The expression of Gamma function is Γ(t) =
∫∞
0
xtex dxx
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domestic market share Sh,t is
Sh,t = Pr{ph,m,t < pf,m,t}
=
∫ ∞
0
[1−Gf,t(p)]dGh,t(p)
=
∫ ∞
0
e−φtZtCt(Wt)−θdpθt
=
ZtCt(Wt)
−θ
φt
Home firm’s Foreign market share is given by
Sf,t =
Zt[Ct(Wt)τ/Et]−θ
Zt[Ct(Wt)τ/Et]−θ + Z∗tW ∗t −θ
81
APPENDIX B. GLOBALIZATION, OFFSHORING AND MONETARY CONTROL
2. Calibration Table
Table B.1. Calibration
Preference Parameters Value
β: household’s discount factor 0.99
η: 1
η−1 is the Frisch labor supply elasticity 5
σ: risk aversion coefficient 1
Technology Parameters Value
ψ: international financial intermediation cost 0.01
φ: measures the magnitude of price adjustment cost 33
µ: elasticity of substitution between different variety of manufactured input 3.8
θ: trade elasticity 4
γ: elasticity of substitution between final goods 3.8
ρz: persistency of technology shock 0.83
Monetary policy Value
Π˜: steady state inflation 1.0086
ρν : persistency of monetary policy shock 0.76
Φpi: stance of monetary policy with respect to inflation 1.5
ΦY : stance of monetary policy with respect to real GDP 0.5
µz = 1 and µ
∗
z = 0.07: Home and Foreign steady state values of aggregate technology
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3. The Full Model
Incomplete Market
The equilibrium conditions of the model under incomplete market are listed as
following, which include twenty-two equations in twenty-two endogenous variables
Ct, C
∗
t , rt, r
∗
t , it, ht, h
∗
t ,Πt,Π
∗
t , wt, w
∗
t , ct(wt), Yt, Y
∗
t , YGDP,t, Y
∗
GPD,t, pm,t, p
∗
m,t, Sh,t, Sf,t, bI,t, Qt
among which there are three pre-determined variables bI,t, rt, r
∗
t .
Euler Equation (Domestic Bond)
βE[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
rt
Πt+1
] = 1 and βE[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
r∗t
Π∗t+1
] = 1
Euler Equations (International bond)
βE[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
it
pit+1
] = 1 + ψ(bI,t − b¯I)
βE[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
it
pit+1
Qt
Qt+1
] = 1 + ψ(
−bI,t
Qt
− b¯I)
Labor Supply
hη−1t =
wt
Cσt
and h∗η−1t =
w∗t
C∗σt
Home Manufacturing Sector Input Cost
ct(wt) = w
∗
tQtF (1, λ) +
∫ wt
w∗tQt
xdF (x,
λ
w∗tQt
) + wt[1− F (wt, λ
w∗tQt
)]
Manufactured Good Price Index
pm,t = [Ztct(wt)
−θ + Z∗t (w
∗
t τQt)
−θ]−
1
θ [Γ(
1− µ+ θ
θ
)]
1
1−µ
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p∗m,t = {Zt[
ct(wt)τ
Qt
]−θ + Z∗t w
∗
t
−θ}− 1θ [Γ(1− µ+ θ
θ
)]
1
1−µ
Home Manufacturing Firms’ Market Shares
Sh,t =
Ztct(wt)
−θ
Ztct(wt)−θ + Z∗t (w∗tQtτ)−θ
and Sf,t =
Zt[
ct(wt)τ
Qt
]−θ
Z∗t w∗t
−θ + Zt[
ct(wt)τ
Qt
]−θ
Labor Demand conditions
pm,tSh,tYt + p
∗
m,tSf,tY
∗
t Qt =ct(wt)
ht
1− F (wt, λw∗tQt )
pm,t(1− Sh,t)Yt + p∗m,tQt(1− Sf,t)Y ∗t =w∗t h∗tQt + wtht − ct(wt)
ht
1− F (wt, λw∗tQt )
New Keynesian Philips Curve
1 =
γ
γ − 1pm,t −
φ
γ − 1(
Πt
Π
− 1)Πt
Π
+ β
φ
γ − 1E[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ(
Πt+1
Π
− 1)Πt+1
Π
Yt+1
Yt
]
1 =
γ
γ − 1p
∗
m,t −
φ
γ − 1(
Π∗t
Π
− 1)Π
∗
t
Π
+ β
φ
γ − 1E[(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ(
Π∗t+1
Π
− 1)Π
∗
t+1
Π
Y ∗t+1
Y ∗t
]
Monetary Policy Rules
ln(rt)− ln(r) = ρi[ln(rt−1)− ln(r)] + ΦY [ln(YGDP,t)− ln(YGDP )] + Φpi[ln(Πt])− ln(Π)] + r,t
ln(r∗t )−ln(r∗) = ρi[ln(r∗t−1)−ln(r∗)]+ΦY [ln(Y ∗GDP,t)−ln(Y ∗GDP )]+Φpi[ln(Π∗t ])−ln(Π∗)]+r∗,t
GDP
YGDP,t = (1− pm,t)Yt + wtht − φ
2
(
Πt
Π˜
− 1)2Yt
Y ∗GDP,t = (1− p∗m,t)Y ∗t + w∗t h∗t −
φ
2
(
Π∗t
Π˜∗
− 1)2Y ∗t
Final Goods Market Clear
Ct = Yt − φ
2
(
Πt
Π˜
− 1)2Yt and C∗t = Y ∗t −
φ
2
(
Π∗t
Π˜
− 1)2Y ∗t
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In addition, the model features two structural shock series following AR(1) process with
i.i.d error term: ln(Υt) = (1− ρz)E[ln(Υt)] + ρz ln(Υt−1) + Υ,t, where index Υ = {Zt, Z∗t }
stand for technology shocks in Home and Foreign countries.
Financial Autarky
Under financial autarky, the equilibrium conditions include twenty equations in twenty
endogenous variables.
Ct, C
∗
t , rt, r
∗
t , ht, h
∗
t ,Πt,Π
∗
t , wt, w
∗
t , ct(wt), Yt, Y
∗
t , YGDP,t, Y
∗
GPD,t, pm,t, p
∗
m,t, Sh,t, Sf,t, Qt
among which there are two pre-determined variables, rt, r
∗
t .
Among the twenty equations, seventeen of them are the same as those in incomplete
market: Euler equations of holding domestic bond, the labor supply equations, Home man-
ufacturing sector input cost, the price index of manufactured goods, the Home producers’
market shares, New Keynesian Philips Curve, the definition of real GDP, final goods market
clear and the monetary policy rules. The remaining three equations are given as following.
Labor Demand Conditions
pm,tYt = wtht and p
∗
m,tY
∗
t = w
∗
t h
∗
t
Trade Balance
p∗m,tQtSf,tY
∗
t = pm,t(1− Sh,t)Yt
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4. Steady State Allocation
Since the holdings of international assets are zero at steady state, the trade balance
condition holds, and the model under incomplete international financial market and the
model under financial autarky have identical steady state allocations. I use variables without
time subscript to denote the steady state value of that variable. At steady state, Π = Π∗ =
Π˜, r = r∗ = i = Π˜β , bI = 0, pm = p
∗
m =
γ−1
γ and C = Y , C
∗ = Y ∗.
With labor supply conditions, I can express the steady state values of Home consump-
tion, C, and Foreign consumption C∗ as functions of Home and Foreign wages:
C = (
γ − 1
γ
w
η
1−η )
1−η
σ+η−1 C∗ = (
γ − 1
γ
w∗
η
1−η )
1−η
σ+η−1
The manufactured goods’ market clear conditions for both countries are given by
γ − 1
γ
C = wh
γ − 1
γ
C∗ = w∗h∗
from which I can express the steady state values of Home hours worked, h, and Foreign
hours worked, h∗ in terms of Home and Foreign consumption and Home and Foreign wages.
Since Home and Foreign have different average technology levels, Home variables and
Foreign variables have different steady state solutions, and steady state values of most
variables don’t have analytical expressions. I can solve c(w), w, w∗ and Q jointly from the
expressions of Home and Foreign manufactured goods’ price index, the Home manufacturing
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firm’s unit input cost and the Home labor market clear condition, which are given by
[c(w)−θ + (w∗τQ)−θ]−
1
θ [Γ(
1− µ+ θ
θ
)]
1
1−µ =
γ − 1
γ
{[c(w)τ
Q
]−θ + w∗−θ}− 1θ [Γ(1− µ+ θ
θ
)]
1
1−µ =
γ − 1
γ
c(w) = w∗QF (1, λ) +
∫ w
w∗Q
xdF (x,
λ
w∗Q
) + w[1− F (w, λ
w∗Q
)]
pmShY + p
∗
mSfY
∗Q = c(w)
h
1− F (w, λw∗Q)
I use the MATLAB routine to solve this group of nonlinear equations. With the steady state
values of c(w), w∗ and Q, I can solve for the Home manufacturing firms’ market shares,
Sh,t, Sf,t, Home and Foreign consumption, C and C
∗, and Home and Foreign hours worked,
h and h∗.
With these values, the steady state values of Home and Foreign real GDP, YGDP,t,
Y ∗GPD,t can be solved accordingly.
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5. Log-linearized Model
Incomplete Market
Since at steady state, the international asset holdings are zero, the percentage deviations
of bond holdings from the steady state are normalized as bˆI,t = dbI,t
Euler Equation(Domestic Bond)
Cˆt = E[Cˆt+1]− 1
σ
(rˆt − E[Πˆt+1]) and Cˆ∗t = E[Cˆ∗t+1]−
1
σ
(rˆ∗t − E[Πˆ∗t+1])
Euler Equation(International Bond)
−σ(E[Cˆt+1]− Cˆt) + iˆt − E[Πˆt+1] = ψ(bˆI,t)
−σ(E[Cˆ∗t+1]− Cˆ∗t ) + iˆt − E[Πˆt+1] + Qˆt − E[Qˆt+1] = ψ(−bˆI,t − Qˆt)
Labor Supply
(η − 1)hˆt = wˆt − σCˆt and (η − 1)hˆ∗t = wˆ∗t − σCˆ∗t
Home Manufacturing Sector Input Cost
cˆt(wt) =
we−
λw
w∗Q
c(w)
wˆt +
w∗Q(1− e−λ − λe−λ) + ∫ ww∗Q( λxw∗Q)e− λxw∗Q ( λxw∗Q − 1)dx+ λw2w∗Qe− λww∗Q
c(w)
(wˆ∗t + Qˆt)
(5.1)
Manufactured Goods’ Price Index
pˆm,t =
cˆt(wt)
1 + τ−θ
+
τ−θ
1 + τ−θ
(wˆ∗t + Qˆt)−
Zˆt + τ
−θZˆ∗t
θ(1 + τ−θ)
(5.2)
pˆ∗m,t =
τ−θ
1 + τ−θ
[cˆt(wt)− Qˆt] + wˆ
∗
t
1 + τ−θ
− Zˆtτ
−θ + Zˆ∗t
θ(1 + τ−θ)
(5.3)
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Home Manufacturing Firms’ Market Shares
Sˆh,t =
θτ−θ
1 + τ−θ
[wˆ∗t + Qˆt − cˆt(wt) +
Zˆt − Zˆ∗t
θ
] (5.4)
Sˆf,t =
θ
1 + τ−θ
[wˆ∗t + Qˆt − cˆt(wt) +
Zˆt − Zˆ∗t
θ
] (5.5)
Labor Demand Condition
pmShY
YM
(pˆm,t + Sˆh,t + Yˆt) +
p∗mSfY ∗Q
YM
(pˆ∗m,t + Sˆf,t + Yˆ
∗
t + Qˆt)
=cˆt(wt) + hˆt +
λw
w∗Q
(wˆt − wˆ∗t − Qˆt) (5.6)
pm(1− Sh)Y
Y ∗M
(pˆm,t − Sh
1− Sh Sˆh,t + Yˆt) +
p∗m(1− Sf )Y ∗Q
Y ∗M
(pˆ∗m,t −
SF
1− Sf Sˆf,t + Yˆ
∗
t + Qˆt)
=
w∗Qh∗
Y ∗M
(wˆ∗t + Qˆt + hˆ
∗
t )−
c(w)he
λw
w∗Q
Y ∗M
[cˆt(wt) + hˆt +
λw
w∗Q
(wˆt − wˆ∗t − Qˆt)] +
wh
Y ∗M
(wˆt + hˆt)
(5.7)
where
YM = pmShY + p
∗
mSfY
∗Q
Y ∗M = pm(1− Sh)Y + p∗m(1− Sf )Y ∗Q
Price Evolution
Πˆt = βE[Πˆt+1] +
γ − 1
φ
pˆm,t and Πˆ
∗
t = βE[Πˆ
∗
t+1] +
γ − 1
φ
pˆ∗m,t
Monetary Policy
rˆt = ρirˆt−1 + ΦΠΠˆt + ΦY YˆGDP,t + ˆr,t
rˆ∗t = ρirˆ
∗
t−1 + ΦΠΠˆ
∗
t + ΦY Yˆ
∗
GDP,t + ˆ
∗
r,t
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Final good market clear conditions
Cˆt = Yˆt and Cˆ
∗
t = Yˆ
∗
t
GDP
YˆGDP,t = −pmpˆm,t + (1− pm,t)Yˆt + pm(wˆt + hˆt)
Yˆ ∗GDP,t = −p∗mpˆ∗m,t + (1− p∗m,t)Yˆ ∗t + p∗m(wˆ∗t + hˆ∗t )
Current Account
Π
β
(bˆI,t − iˆt)− bˆI,t−1 = wˆt + hˆt − wˆ∗t − hˆ∗t − Qˆt − pˆm,t − Yˆt + pˆ∗m,t + Yˆ ∗t + Qˆt
Financial Autarky
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions are given as following.
Labor Demand Condition
pˆm,t + Yˆt = wˆt + hˆt and pˆ
∗
m,t + Yˆ
∗
t = wˆ
∗
t + hˆ
∗
t
Trade Balance
pˆ∗m,t + Qˆt + Sˆf,t + Yˆ
∗
t = pˆm,t + Sˆh,t + Yˆt
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6. Log-linearized Labor Demand Conditions under Incomplete Market
Given the log-linearized expressions of Home manufactured goods’ price index equations,
equations 5.2 and 5.3, and Home manufacturing firms’s market share, equations 5.4 and
5.5, the log-linearized labor demand conditions can be rewritten as
hˆt =[
pmShY
YM
(1− Sh) + p
∗
mSfY
∗Q
YM
(1− Sf )](1 + θ)[wˆ∗t + Qˆt − cˆt(wt)]
− λw
w∗Q
(wˆt − wˆ∗t − Qˆt) +
pmShY
YM
Yˆt +
p∗mSfY ∗Q
YM
Yˆ ∗t
hˆ∗t =
YM + Y
∗
M
w∗h∗Q
cˆt(wt) + [
pmY
w∗Qh∗
(1− Sh) + p
∗
mY
∗Q
w∗Qh∗
(1− Sf )][wˆ∗t + Qˆt − cˆt(wt)]
+
pmY
w∗Qh∗
Yˆt +
p∗mY ∗Q
w∗Qh∗
Yˆ ∗t − wˆ∗t − Qˆt −
wh
w∗Qh∗
(wˆt + hˆt)
With the log-linearized expressions of Home manufacturing sector’s input cost equation 5.1
cˆt(wt) =
we−
λw
w∗Q
c(w)
wˆt +
w∗Q(1− e−λ − λe−λ) + ∫ ww∗Q( λxw∗Q)e− λxw∗Q ( λxw∗Q − 1)dx+ λw2w∗Qe− λww∗Q
c(w)
(wˆ∗t + Qˆt)
and Cˆt = Yˆt and Cˆ
∗
t = Yˆ
∗
t , Home and Foreign labor demand can be expressed in terms
of Home and Foreign real wages, wˆt, wˆ
∗
t , real exchange rate Qˆt, and Home and Foreign
consumption demand Cˆt and Cˆ
∗
t . The elasticities of Home and Foreign labor demand with
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respect to these five variables are given by
∂hˆt
∂wˆt
= −Ξ1Ξ3 − λw
w∗Q
∂hˆt
∂wˆ∗t
=
∂hˆt
∂Qˆt
= Ξ1(1− Ξ2) + λw
w∗Q
∂hˆt
∂Cˆt
=
pmShY
YM
∂hˆt
∂Cˆ∗t
=
p∗mSfY ∗Q
YM
∂hˆ∗t
∂wˆ∗t
=
∂hˆ∗t
∂Qˆt
=
YM + Y
∗
M
w∗h∗Q
Ξ2 + Ξ4(1− Ξ2)− 1− wh
w∗h∗Q
[Ξ1(1− Ξ2) + λw
w∗Q
]
∂hˆ∗t
∂wˆt
= (
YM + Y
∗
M
w∗h∗Q
− Ξ4)Ξ3 − wh
w∗h∗Q
(1− Ξ1Ξ3 − λw
w∗Q
)
∂hˆ∗t
∂Cˆt
=
pmY
w∗Qh∗
− wh
w∗h∗Q
pmShY
YM
∂hˆ∗t
∂Cˆ∗t
=
p∗mY ∗Q
w∗Qh∗
− p
∗
mSfY
∗Q
YM
wh
w∗h∗Q
where
Ξ1 = [
pmShY
YM
(1− Sh) + p
∗
mSfY
∗Q
YM
(1− Sf )](1 + θ)
Ξ2 =
w∗Q(1− e−λ − λe−λ) + ∫ ww∗Q[( λxw∗Q)2e− λxw∗Q − λxw∗Qe− λxw∗Q ]dx+ λw2w∗Qe− λww∗Q
c(w)
Ξ3 =
we−
λw
w∗Q
c(w)
Ξ4 =
pmY
w∗Qh∗
(1− Sh) + p
∗
mY
∗Q
w∗Qh∗
(1− Sf )
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APPENDIX C
Import Competition and Changing U.S. Manufacturing
Employment Structural Dynamics
1. List of the Data Series
The labor intensity measure of industry i, LIi is given by
LIi =
∑
t Production and Non-Supervisory Employeesi∑
t Capital Stocki
This paper defines labor-intensive industries as the industries with LIi above 30th per-
centile, and the capital-intensive industries as the industries with LIi below the 70th per-
centile.
The detailed list of industries that are included in the dataset and their labor intensity
properties are given in the table in next page.
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Table C.1. List of Industries
NAICS Industry Names Labor Intensive Capital Intensive
3352 Household appliances
3121(p) and 3122(p) Beverages and tobacco products CI(E,P)
315(p) Apparel LI(E,P)
316(p) Leather and allied products LI(E,P)
321(p) Wood products LI(E)
324(p) Petroleum and coal products CI(E,P)
327(p) Nonmetallic mineral products
332991 Ball and roller bearings
333111 Farm machinery and equipment
3332 Industrial machinery
334111 Electronic computers CI(E)
3342(p) Communications equipment CI(E,P)
3361 Automobiles CI(E)
336211(p) Motor vehicle bodies LI(E)
3379(p) Other furniture-related products LI(E,P)
339(p) Miscellaneous manufacturing
311(p) Food manufacturing
313(p) Textile mills
314(p) Textile product mills LI(E,P)
322(p) Paper and paper products CI(E,P)
323(p) Printing and related support activities
325(p) Chemicals CI(E,P)
326(p) Plastics and rubber products
3219(p) Other wood products LI(E,P)
Note: NAICS index with ’p’ in parenthesis indicates that the production and non-
production worker series include that industry. LI(E) indicates that the industry is
labor-intensive for ’All Employees’ dataset. ’P’ denotes ’Production Nonsupervisory
Employees’.
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